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Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse
Theory of Contractual Liability
Nathan B. Oman
ABSTRACT: In the ancient Near East, contracts were often solemnized by
hacking up a goat. The ritual was an enacted penalty clause: “If I breach
this contract, let it be done to me as we are doing to the goat.” This Article
argues that we are not so far removed from our goat-hacking forbearers.
Legal scholars have argued that contractual liability is best explained by the
morality of promise making, or by the need to create optimal incentives in
contractual performance. In contrast, this Article argues for the simpler,
rawer claim that contractual liability consists of consent to retaliation in the
event of breach. In the ancient ritual with the goat, the consented-to
retaliation consisted of self-help violence against life and limb. The private
law in effect domesticates and civilizes retaliation by replacing private
warfare with civil recourse through the courts. It thus facilitates the social
cooperation made possible by the ancient threats of retaliation, while
avoiding the danger of escalation and violence that such private violence
presented. This civil recourse theory of contractual liability provides an
explanation for a number of remedial doctrines that have proven difficult
for rival interpretations of contract law to explain—including the penaltyclause doctrine, limitations on expectation damages, and the basic privatelaw structure of contractual liability. Finally, this Article responds to some
of the most powerful objections that might be made against a civil recourse
theory of contractual liability.
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INTRODUCTION

Many of the earliest contracts were bloody affairs. Both Homer and the
Bible recount covenant rituals in which promisors slaughtered animals and
poured their blood on the ground to seal a bargain. In essence, these
sanguinary rituals consisted of consent to retaliation in the event of breach.
When promisors hacked up a goat, they consented to be hacked up in like
manner should they breach. While the modern legal world seems very
different from the violent one depicted in these ancient sources, this Article
theorizes that contemporary contract law is much closer to these ancient
covenant rituals than we suppose. Modern scholars have struggled to
account for contractual liability in terms of the moral obligation to keep a
promise, the need for incentives to promote optimal investment in contract
performance, and other social goals.1 This Article argues in favor of a
simpler, rawer claim: contractual liability consists of consent to retaliation in
the event of breach. Of course, the retaliation consented to in a modern
contract consists of recourse through the courts, rather than violence
against life and limb. We moderns, however, are closer to our goat-hacking
forbearers than we assume.
This is an interpretive claim about contractual liability. The goal of such
a theory is not to explain what contract law would look like in the best of all
possible worlds. Rather, the goal is to reveal the normative structure of
contractual liability as it currently exists. Such a theory can be valuable for a
number of reasons. First, it increases our philosophical understanding of an
important social practice. To the extent that we can show that our current
law—or some portion of it—represents a set of coherent goals and choices
rather than the outcome of essentially random historical accidents, we
understand the law better. Second, to the extent that we believe that judges
should decide cases according to preexisting legal rules, or should shift legal
doctrine in ways that nevertheless retain continuity with previous law, we
need an interpretive account of our law as it now stands. Finally, an
understanding of the normative structure of our current law is important
when we propose reforms to change it. Such proposals never exist in a
vacuum, but must be measured against the value of our current law. To
justify replacing current rules with something new, we must understand the
values—if any—instantiated in our current law. Only then can we judge
whether a proposed change will be an improvement. Understanding the

1. See, e.g., Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 24 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (summarizing contemporary debates over the theory
of contract law); James Gordley, Contract, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 3
(Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003) (same); Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687 (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (same).
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normative foundations of our current law is thus an integral part of the way
it, to use Lord Mansfield’s phrase, “works itself pure.”2
I label the core interpretive claim of this Article—that contractual
liability consists of consent to retaliation in the event of breach—the civil
recourse theory. Civil recourse has been a much-discussed topic in the
philosophy of tort law.3 In that context, civil recourse theorists have focused
on the fact that at its core, private law empowers plaintiffs to act against
defendants, rather than having the State step in as a third-party enforcer of
some set of moral duties or as a provider of optimal economic incentives.
This Article is the first attempt to articulate in detail a civil recourse theory
of contractual liability. I label the theory offered here a civil recourse theory
with the knowledge that there is some risk of confusion in terming it as such.
The civil recourse theory of contractual liability shares with civil recourse
accounts of tort law an emphasis on private law’s role as an empowerer of
plaintiffs rather than an independent enforcer of norms. It also shares with
these theories a sense that private law represents the civilization of earlier
forms of violent self-help. Ultimately, however, this Article offers a different
normative justification for civil recourse than those offered by tort theorists,
and one that is less embarrassed about defending the virtues of private
retaliation.
We begin by setting forth the civil recourse theory with a stylized
recreation of the progress from anarchic systems of contract enforcement to
the contemporary common law of contracts. In ancient covenant rituals,
parties consented to violent retaliation in the event of breach. Over time,
this consent to violent retaliation was transformed into consent to the
extraction of wealth through the courts. This can be seen most clearly in the
penal bond, which was the dominant contractual mechanism for much of
the common law’s history. Finally, as scholars of relational contracts have
long pointed out, legal rights under contracts do not capture the full
complexities of the relationship between the parties. In modern litigation,
legal contracts function as weapons that can be used in the event of a
2. Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.) 23; 1 Atk. 22, 34 (Lord
Mansfield) (emphasis omitted).
3. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to
a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) [hereinafter Goldberg, Constitutional
Status]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003)
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 1, at 623; Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998); see also
Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and
Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1023 (2005) (criticizing the theory); John Finnis, Natural Law:
The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW,
supra note 1, at 1 (same); Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursksy’s Civil Recourse Theory,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529 (2006) (same). For a summary of the debates from which their civil
recourse theory of tort law emerged, see John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91
GEO. L.J. 513 (2003).
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breakdown in relations between the parties. Modern parties understand that
when they contract they do not simply define their reciprocal obligations.
Rather, they make themselves vulnerable to attack via litigation in the event
of breach. This historical foray suggests that consent to retaliation in the
event of breach represents the deep structure of contractual liability. What
began as a bloody system of violence and self-help has been civilized into a
system of civil recourse through the courts. The basic structure, however, of
consent to retaliation continues.
From this interpretive claim, we turn to the normative case in favor of
the civil recourse theory. Although not offered as a policy proposal, a
successful interpretive argument should still present current law as at least
normatively plausible. This Article frankly embraces the virtues of allowing
retaliation. Providing recourse against contract breakers allows promisees to
threaten retaliation in the event of breach. This threat, in turn, facilitates
cooperation by reducing the problem of ex post opportunism. The insight
here is tied to the basic understanding of executory contracts as presenting a
prisoner’s dilemma. Contrary to the conventional story in the literature, this
Article argues that contract law does not solve this problem through thirdparty enforcement of contract obligations. Instead, by facilitating retaliation
against breaching promisors by disappointed promisees, contract law allows
contracting parties to credibly threaten defectors with personal retaliation.
The civil recourse theory, though, is necessarily limited. It is only a theory of
liability and remedies. It does not purport to be a complete justification of
contract law. Indeed, the civil recourse theory suggests that a broader
account of contract law will be necessarily pluralistic, resting on a number of
normative concerns.
The civil recourse theory does, however, shed light on some persistent
puzzles in the remedial law of contracts. First, it views expectation damages
as an upper limit on retaliation by plaintiffs against defendants, rather than
as an optimal incentive for performance or as compensation for the value of
a broken promise. Accordingly, the ubiquitous deviations from the strict
expectation measure that we see in current doctrine are not troubling. One
can accommodate pragmatic or efficiency concerns by limiting recovery
without compromising the basic justification for contractual liability. In
contrast, such limitations become problematic if damages are viewed
through the lenses of rival theories—such as promissory morality or
economic efficiency. Second, the rule against penalty clauses is awkward for
both autonomy and efficiency theories, which see it as a suspicious limitation
on contractual freedom. In contrast, the rule flows naturally from a recourse
theory of contract, which seeks to limit plaintiffs’ rights of retaliation against
defendants to a proportional or “civil” response. Third, civil recourse theory
accounts for the basic private-law structure of contractual liability—
specifically, the bilateralism of contract damages and private standing.
Bilateralism refers to the fact that damages are always paid from defendants
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to plaintiffs, rather than as fines to the State. Private standing refers to the
fact that rather than enforcing contractual obligations, the State waits for
plaintiffs to initiate and control litigation. Both of these features are
awkward for rival theories of contract, but flow naturally from the idea of
civil recourse.
The civil recourse theory is open to a number of objections. First, it
seems to valorize revenge, which we usually regard as morally abhorrent.
This objection, however, fails to differentiate between facilitating retaliation
as a means of social ordering versus mere predation or retribution. Second,
a civil recourse theory seems inconsistent with some of the language used by
judges. An interpretive theory ought to take such language more seriously
than the one presented here apparently does. This objection can be met by
understanding the limited demands that judicial language places even on
interpretive theories, as well as by explaining how judicial language is not as
inconsistent with a civil recourse theory as one might assume. Finally, the
rules regarding contract formation, particularly under American law, do not
appear to turn on consent to recourse. The doctrines of consideration and
promissory estoppel seem to pick out a class of agreements that, for
whatever reason, are worthy of enforcement, regardless of whether the
parties consent to recourse.4 Contract formation rules, however, can be seen
as doing a rough and ready job of identifying agreements where parties
would expect a promisee to claim a right of recourse upon default.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II sets out the interpretive claim
that contractual liability consists of consent to recourse in the event of
breach; Part III provides a normative argument in support of this
interpretive claim, showing how facilitating retaliation can serve laudable
social goals; Part IV extends the theory by showing its implications for some
puzzles in contract doctrine; Part V responds to objections; and Part VI
concludes.
II. CONSENT AND CIVIL RECOURSE
Contractual liability consists of consent by promisors to retaliation by
promisees in the event of default. Put in starker terms, when you and I make

4. Indeed, consent to be legally bound is not an element of contract formation in the
United States, and plays only a vestigial role in English and Commonwealth law. See 1 CHITTY
ON CONTRACTS ¶ 2-153, at 198 (H.G. Beale et al. eds., 29th ed. 2004) (noting that English law
requires an intention to be legally bound to form a contract). In actual fact, even under English
law, the intent to be legally bound is the subject of a strong presumption, particularly in
commercial contracts. See id. ¶ 2-154, at 199 (“In the case of ordinary commercial transactions
it is not normally necessary to prove that the parties to an express agreement in fact intended to
create legal relations.”). Thus, P.S. Atiyah insists that “[i]t is . . . more realistic to say that no
positive intention to enter into legal relations needs to be shown.” P.S. ATIYAH, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 153 (5th ed. 1995). Indeed, so strong is the
presumption that English courts have found a binding contract even where the promisor
believed that his promise had no legal effect. Id.
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a contract, I consent to your right to attack me if I breach. In support of this
claim, we examine a highly stylized account of the rise of contract law, one
that begins with ancient covenant rituals and shows the recourse theory of
contract in its rawest form. This Article argues that while the methods and
limits of legitimate recourse under current law are very different than those
envisioned by these ancient rituals, the underlying logic of the relationship
between promisor, promisee, and contract is the same. These historical
examples are meant to offer an insight into the current structure of the law,
rather than provide a complete account of its origins. A true history of
contract would necessarily be more complex than what follows.5 The
historical examples here are meant to bring to the surface the latent
structure of our current law.
A. CUTTING A COVENANT
The fifteenth chapter of Genesis in the Bible records one of the most
famous contracts in history. Abram (later renamed Abraham) has left his
homeland in Ur and come to the land of Canaan. After defeating a coalition
of local kings, Abram has a vision in which God promises the childless
patriarch that his decedents will outnumber the stars of heaven and that he
will inherit the land of Canaan. The skeptical Abram asks, “O Lord God,
how am I to know that I shall possess it?”6 The text goes on: “[God] said to
him, ‘Bring me a heifer three years old, a she-goat three years old, a ram
three years old, a turtledove, and a young pigeon.’ And he brought him all
these, cut them in two, and laid each half over against the other . . . .”7 It is,
to modern ears, a strange story. Abram doubts God’s promise, but his doubts
are allayed when God instructs him to dismember three animals. Why does
the ritual with the mutilated livestock convince Abram that God’s promise is
meant seriously? While the answer is obscure to us, it would have been
apparent to an ancient reader. God’s response to Abram transforms his
promise into a legal covenant by invoking the formality by which such
covenants were created in the ancient Near East.8

5. See generally DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS (1999) (providing a history of the common law of contracts); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT: THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (1975)
(same).
6. Genesis 15:8 (RSV) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id. 15:9–10.
8. See ROBERT DAVIDSON, GENESIS 12–50, at 45 (1979) (“From the one other Old
Testament reference (Jer. 34: 18–20) and extra-biblical parallels, it seems that the rite was a
form of dramatized curse. The parties as they walked between the severed halves were in effect
saying, ‘May God do so to me if I violate this solemn agreement.’”); ZE’EV W. FALK, HEBREW LAW
IN BIBLICAL TIMES 89 (2d ed. 2001) (“[I]n the patriarchal age the parties used to kill an animal
as a sign of the punishment to befall the person who broke the covenant.”).
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The slaughter of the heifer and the she-goat was an enacted penalty
clause.9 In effect, the parties to a covenant agreed that, in the event that they
failed to fulfill their part of the bargain, they should be treated in the same
manner as the dismembered animals. Indeed, in Biblical Hebrew one does
not “make a covenant.” The phrase is translated more literally as to “cut a
covenant.”10 The formality of killing an animal to seal a deal was widespread
in the ancient world—appearing, for example, in Babylonian treaties, and
the agreement dividing Alexander the Great’s empire upon his death where
his generals hacked up a dog.11 Thomas Hobbes notes the form in
Leviathan, writing that, “before the time of Civill Society . . . there is nothing
can strengthen a Covenant of Peace . . . but . . . [the] Feare as a Revenger of
their perfidy. . . . Such was the Heathen Forme, Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill
this Beast.”12
In part, as Hobbes noted, the ritual invoked the punishment of the gods
(an ironic position for the militantly monotheistic Yahweh to take in Genesis
15), but it also may have been embedded in a system of self-help. The
relationship is nicely captured in Book III of The Iliad when Priam, the King
of Troy, and Agamemnon, leader of the besieging Achaeans, agree to end
their war through single combat between champions from either side. They
formalize the agreement by slitting the throats of a brace of sheep and
pouring their blood, along with wine, on the ground as a libation to the
gods. The Trojans and Achaeans then join in a prayer: “Zeus—god of
greatness, god of glory, all you immortals! Whichever contenders trample on
this treaty first, spill their brains on the ground as this wine spills—theirs,
their children’s too—their enemies rape their wives!”13 Notice the prayer
invokes not only the wrath of the gods, but also suggests the legitimacy of
violence against oath breakers and their families.14 In an anarchic world of

9. Genesis 15:8 (RSV).
10. See 7 THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT 351 (G. Johannes Botterweck
et al. eds., David E. Green trans., 1995) (discussing the meaning of the Hebrew term “karat” in
the context of covenant making).
11. See L. ELLIOTT BINNS, THE BOOK OF THE PROPHET JEREMIAH 262 n.19 (1919)
(discussing the dismembering of the dog among Alexander the Great’s generals); BRUCE
VAWTER, ON GENESIS: A NEW READING 211–12 (1977) (providing the Babylonian examples).
12. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 99 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651).
13. HOMER, THE ILIAD 138 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1990) (c. 800 B.C.E.).
14. Charles Fensham describes the legitimacy of violence following breach:
On a breach of covenant punishment must follow. The curses of the gods in the
extrabiblical material is a deterrent, but not an actual punishment. . . . [D]irect
punishment on the breach of covenant [as opposed to a lawsuit] is probably the
only one which could have been used by Near Eastern kings . . . .
F. Charles Fensham, Malediction and Benediction in Ancient Near Eastern Vassal-Treaties and the Old
Testament, 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE ALTTESTAMENTLICHE WISSENSCHAFT (n.s.) 1, 7–8 (1962)
(Ger.).

A3 - OMAN.DOC

2011]

12/15/2010 9:24 PM

CONSENT TO RETALIATION

537

feuding tribes, this ex ante authorization would have been particularly
important because it would allow a disappointed promisee to exact
vengeance on a promisor without fear of retaliation by members of the
promisor’s tribe.15
If the ancient sources valorize the right of private retaliation without
ambivalence, they also show an interest in limiting retaliation. The most
famous example of this concern is found in the Bible. According to the Book
of Exodus, the divine law delivered to Moses at Sinai declared: “When men
strive together . . . . [i]f any harm follows, then you shall give life for life, eye
for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound
for wound, stripe for stripe.”16 Hence, retaliation was limited by some
principle of proportionality. To take more than an eye for an eye was to
engage in predation. According to the Talmud, the bloody, but limited,
retaliation sanctioned by the lex talionis was then converted into the payment
of money.17 Likewise, the earliest Germanic and Anglo-Saxon laws contained
a schedule of wergild that might be proffered in lieu of blood feud.18 Indeed,
according to nineteenth-century historians, private law itself emerged from
attempts to limit the violence of feuding tribes. “Step by step, as the power of
the State waxes,” wrote Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland,
“the self-centred and self-helping autonomy of the kindred wanes. Private
feud is controlled, regulated, put, one may say, into legal harness . . . .”19
B. PENAL BONDS
Although in early English law the “law of contract [was] rudimentary, so
rudimentary as to be barely distinguishable from the law of property,” it is
possible to discern the successive limitations on earlier forms of self-help

15. Indeed, the Bible records at least one case in which a promisor explicitly agreed to
violence by the promisee in the event of breach. During the invasion of Canaan recounted in
the Book of Joshua, the Israelites send two spies into the city of Jericho, where they are hidden
and assisted by a prostitute named Rahab. Rahab and the spies exchange oaths, but the spies
insist that “if you tell this business of ours, then we shall be guiltless with respect to your oath
which you have made us swear,” meaning that when the Israelites sacked the city they would be
within their rights to kill Rahab and her family. Joshua 2:20 (RSV) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16. Exodus 21:22–25 (RSV).
17. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 63–68 (2006) (discussing rabbinic
interpretation of the lex talionis).
18. See 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 47–48 (2d ed. rev. 1968) (1895) (discussing wergild and
composition in early Anglo-Saxon law).
19. Id. at 31. Modern historians have questioned the seemingly neat narrative of organic
progression put forward by Pollock and Maitland, noting that litigation coexisted in many early
societies less as a substitute for the blood feud than as alternative mode of attack in the conflict
between persons and clans. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 17, at 119–21. But see POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 18, at 47 (noting that feud and “the semi-judicial arbitration of wise
men” coexisted in medieval Iceland).
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that we see so clearly with the rise of wergild and the decline of feuds.20
Given the circumstances of early English law, the surviving codes are
concerned mainly with claims arising out of violent confrontations21—what
we would classify today as torts.22 Later, the embryonic common law devoted
most of its attention to questions revolving around property in land.23
Nevertheless, in the arena of contract, we see a similar move to civilize
recourse by transforming claims to exact violent retribution into claims for
cash and by replacing self-help with adjudication.
In telling this story, we turn from the bloody world of “cutting
covenants” to the less exotic penal bond, which was the dominant form of
contracting for much of the common law’s history.24 The English borrowed
the mechanism from the Romans. The earliest source of Roman law, the
Twelve Tables, operated in a world where adjudication coexisted with selfhelp violence.25 A debtor who failed to pay on a debt, for example, could be
bound in the marketplace.26 “After the third market day,” the Tables coldbloodedly continued, “let the debtor’s body . . . be cut up in pieces. If the
parts are greater or less than they should be, no liability will be entailed.”27
The mature Roman law replaced the forum’s bloody ritual with contracts
under which a promisor simply agreed to the payment of a sum as
punishment in the event of breach.28 The medieval common law adopted
this device as the penal bond.29 It took the form of a deed in which a
promisor confessed a debt to the promisee—in effect creating a status-based
relationship of creditor and promisor.30 The deed was put in writing and

20. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 18, at 43.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 44–45.
23. See generally id. at 1–28 (describing the evolution of rights in land).
24. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 368–71 (4th ed. 2002).
25. See generally ALAN WATSON, ROME OF THE XII TABLES: PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1975).
26. See Twelve Tables, in THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN 579, 579 (T. Lambert
Mears trans., Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons 1994) (1882) (setting forth rules for commencing a
lawsuit).
27. Id. at 581.
28. See DIG. 44.7.44 (Paul, Ad Edictum Praetoris 74) (“If I have stipulated as follows: ‘Do
you promise to give a hundred if you have not transferred the land?’ Only the hundred is part
of the stipulation, but the land serves for its discharge.”).
29. See Joseph Biancalana, The Development of the Penal Bond with Conditional Defeasance, 26 J.
LEGAL HIST. 103, 103–06 (2005) (discussing the influence of Roman law on early common-law
penal bonds).
30. Judge (then Professor) Morris Sheppard Arnold nicely summarizes the status of debt
in the early common law of contracts:
[I]nstead of saying a defendant promised to pay money, a plaintiff could claim that
he owed it. This is what the writ of debt said simply—debet, he, the defendant, owes.
The writ always was general, although the facts of the transaction giving rise to the
duty to pay would be given in the plaintiff’s declaration. A duty to pay money might
arise (a writ of debt might work) in a great miscellany of situations, most of them
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sealed by the debtor.31 The bond, however, would contain a condition
relieving the promisor of the obligation to pay.32 For example, A would
execute a bond confessing a debt of £100 in a year’s time to B. Noted on the
reverse of the bond, would be a condition relieving A of the obligation to
pay if he conveyed Blackacre to B first. The intention of the parties, of
course, was to transfer Blackacre rather than the £100. The bond’s purpose
was to give B the ability to exact a penalty from A in the event that A failed to
keep this promise to convey Blackacre. Strictly speaking, the bond contained
no legally recognized promise by A to transfer Blackacre. Any such promise
existed only as an extra-legal undertaking by A.
In structure, the penal bond was similar to the covenant ritual of
hacking up a goat. Under both devices, the parties, ex ante, created a system
of recourse against a promisor who breached ex post. The goal was to
provide an in terrorem incentive to perform by giving the promisee a means
of retaliating in the event of breach, while limiting the possibility of
escalation. In the case of Priam and Agamemnon, the Trojans and Achaeans
sought to authorize attacks against breachers that would not lead to a
resumption of the all-out war they were attempting to limit.33 As the
subsequent story of The Iliad shows, they were ultimately unsuccessful, in
part because the violence of the remedy rapidly escalated.34 The penal bond
avoided this problem by eliminating private violence altogether. Initially,
however, the financial scope of the penalty that the promisee could extract
in the event of breach remained largely unregulated.
This shifted in the seventeenth century. Defendants began resorting to
the equity courts, claiming that the penalty due under the bond was
excessive in light of the value of the failed condition. For example, in the
1671 case of Wilson v. Barton, the litigants in an ecclesiastical court agreed to
submit their dispute to a secular court and executed a £200 penalty bond to
secure the contract.35 When the plaintiff refused to submit the case as

consensual. So if a person admitted a debt in a sealed writing—by executing a
scriptum obligatorium, a bond—then a writ claiming that the person debet the obligee
named (or his attorney) would work. The liability arose not because the obligor
impliedly promised to pay, as we ourselves would say, but because he admitted he
owed. The instrument was an I.O.U., not a promissory note, and the writ was said
to be “on the obligation” (sur obligation).
Morris S. Arnold, Transcending Covenant and Debt, 85 YALE L.J. 990, 992 (1974) (reviewing
SIMPSON, supra note 5).
31. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 368; SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 91; Biancalana, supra note
29, at 107.
32. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 368; SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 91; Biancalana, supra note
29, at 103.
33. HOMER, supra note 13, at 138.
34. See id. at 145–63.
35. (1671–1672) 21 Eng. Rep. 812 (Ch.) 812; Nelson 148.
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agreed, the defendant sued on the bond at common law.36 The plaintiff
then petitioned the equity court for relief, “[w]hereupon the Master of the
Rolls granted an Injunction against the Penalty, and directed a Tryal to try
what the Defendants were damnified by the Countermand.”37 In another
case involving a complex marriage contract secured by a £3000 penalty
bond, the equity court declared they “saw no Colour of Cause to give the
said Plaintiff any Relief against the said £3000 Bond and Judgment thereon
had, other than against the Penalty.”38
Ultimately, Parliament sided with the equity courts in a series of laws
passed at the turn of the eighteenth century. The initial procedure adopted
by Parliament suggests an attempt to limit retaliation through the legal
system, rather than an attempt to substitute compensation for penalty.
Hence, under a 1696 statute, a plaintiff suing upon a bond was allowed to
execute on property only up to the value of the damages suffered as a result
of breach.
[B]ut notwithstanding, in each case such judgement shall remaine
continue and be as a further security to answer to the plaintiffe or
plaintiffs and his or their executors or administrators such damages
as shall or may be sustained for further breach of any covenant or
covenants in the same indenture deed or writing . . . .39
Only a decade later, Parliament acted to make payment of damages a full
substitute for the stipulated penalty under the bond.40 The penal bond
continued as a popular transactional form for another century and a half,
mainly because of procedural advantages—such as a longer statute of
limitations—for actions on specialty contracts like bonds, vis-à-vis simple
contracts.41 Following the limitations of the early eighteenth century,
regardless of the penalty specified in the bond, the value of the underlying

36.
37.
38.
104.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Hodkin v. Blackman, (1674–1675) 21 Eng. Rep. 628 (Ch.) 629; 2 Chan. Rep. 103,
Administration of Justice Act, 1696, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 11, § VIII (Eng.).
The amended law stated:
[I]f at any time pending an action upon any such bond with a penalty the
defendant shall bring into [the] court where the action shall be depending all the
principal money and interest due on such bond and also all such costs as have
been expended in any suit or suits in law or equity upon such bond the said money
so brought in shall be deemed and taken to be in full satisfaction and discharge of
the said bond and the court shall and may give judgment to discharge every such
defendant of and from the same accordingly.

Administration of Justice Act, 1705, 4 & 5 Ann., c. 3, § XIII (Eng.).
41. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 325–26; SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 125; Biancalana, supra
note 29, at 113.
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promise represented a ceiling on the plaintiff’s recourse against the
defendant.42
C. RECOURSE AND MODERN LITIGATION
Despite the apparent distance between the worlds of ancient covenants
or penal bonds and modern contract litigation, the notion of contractual
liability as consent to retaliation fits comfortably within modern commercial
practices. Relational contract theorists have long noted the apparent
disjunction between contract doctrine and the actual practices of
contracting parties.43 Contract lawyers often speak as though contracts
specify the obligations of parties over the course of a deal, guiding their
behavior.44 But in practice, formal legal contracts often have little to do with
the complex process of cooperation and mutual accommodation that
characterizes actual business practice.45 Rather, contracts are important not
because they govern the terms of the deal, but because they function as the
basis for litigation in the event of a breakdown in the relationship between
the parties. Lisa Bernstein, for example, has shown how businesspeople
operate under two distinct sets of norms.46 Relationship-maintaining norms
govern ongoing business relationships and are characterized by the informal
42. See BAKER, supra note 24, at 325; SIMPSON, supra note 5, at 122; Biancalana, supra note
29, at 111.
43. Ian Macneil notes:
[A]ll the standard texts on English law reflect a notion that the law of contract
litigation is a relatively neat and logical structure of rules. [I] believe[] this idea to
be inaccurate . . . Contract law is hardly a neat and logical structure of rules, but
like all law a social instrument designed to accomplish the goals of man.
IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL 6
(David Campbell ed., 2001) (quoting IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: INSTRUMENTS FOR SOCIAL
COOPERATION: EAST AFRICA (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963) (“Some
businessmen object that in such a carefully worked out relationship one gets performance only
to the letter of the contract. Such planning indicates a lack of trust and blunts the demands of
friendship, turning a cooperative venture into an antagonistic horse trade.”).
44. Renaud v. Simmons, 254 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (“The contract
specifies the obligations of the parties in detail.”); MACNEIL, supra note 43, at 130–31 (“Thus,
the first two elements of promise in its contractual context are the wills of two or more
individuals with beliefs in the power of one to affect the future—subject to the linkage of the
social matrix essential to exchange.”).
45. Stewart Macaulay describes this reality:
[The lawyers] complained that businessmen desire to “keep it simple and avoid red
tape” even where large amounts of money and significant risks are involved. One
stated that he was “sick of being told, ‘We can trust old Max,’ when the problem is
not one of honesty but one of reaching an agreement that both sides understand.”
Macaulay, supra note 43, at 58–59.
46. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1796 (1996) (describing the difference
between relationship-preserving norms and end-game norms).
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accommodation and cooperation observed by relational contract theorists.47
End-game norms come into play when ongoing relationships have broken
down.48 It is at this point, according to Bernstein, that parties invoke their
formal contract rights.49 Put in starker terms, formal contracts often
function less as guides for cooperation than as weapons to be used when
cooperation breaks down.
This vision of modern practice is consistent with the core structure at
work in the ancient covenant rituals and the penal bond. In both cases, the
formal contract exists to specify the conditions under which a promisee may
retaliate against a wayward promisor. Likewise, modern practice suggests
that it is quite reasonable to suppose that in many—or indeed most—cases,
legal contracts exist mainly to facilitate retaliation in the event that relations
between the parties break down. The contract does more than this, however.
It also radically constrains the ability to retaliate in the end game, by
specifying the conditions under which A may proceed against B, and by
limiting the mode of retaliation to litigation. Furthermore, while speaking of
litigation as a form of attack on a defendant’s wealth, or as retaliation by a
disappointed promisee, may seem odd, it captures an important reality of
modern law. People experience litigation as an aggressive action. Indeed,
military metaphors abound in discussions of litigation.50 Much of this, of
course, can be dismissed as lawyerly machismo. Nevertheless, the rhetoric
persists because it comports with the inevitably antagonistic and aggressive
nature of litigation. When A sues B for breach of contract, he or she makes a
47. Id. (defining relationship-preserving norms as “the norms that transactors choose to
follow when they cooperatively resolve disputes among themselves and want to preserve their
relationship”).
48. Id. (noting that end-game norms are “the norms that transactors would want a thirdparty neutral to apply in a situation where they were unable to cooperatively resolve a dispute
and viewed their relationship as being at an end-game stage”).
49. As Professor Bernstein notes:
[M]erchants behave in ways that reflect an implicit understanding of the
distinction between end-game and relationship-preserving norms and . . . they do
not necessarily want the RPNs they follow during the cooperative phase of their
relationship to be used to resolve disputes when their relationship is at an endgame stage.
Id. at 1798.
50. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 542 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(“fight their own battles by litigating before victory was certain”); Torres-Rosario v. United
States, Civil No. 07-1282, 2010 WL 174884, at *4 (D.P.R. Jan. 13, 2010) (“Petitioner was faced
with a seemingly uphill battle at trial.”); OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Parker, Kern, Nard & Wenzel,
No. 1:09-cv-00257 AWI GSA, 2009 WL 2914203, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2009) (“Defendant
moved to stay the instant action, asserting that it will be required to ‘fight a two-front litigation
war’ because Plaintiff here seeks to adjudicate facts that are the subject of the underlying
action . . . .”); Lock v. Encompass Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-14257, 2009 WL 804151, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 25, 2009) (“During the trial, a battle of the experts ensued.”); Peavey Elecs. Corp. v.
Baan U.S.A., Inc., 07-CA-00341-COA (¶ 8), 10 So. 3d 945, 950 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (en banc)
(“[f]ollowing what the trial court described as an ‘all out war’ of litigation”).
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decision to attack B through the courts, and one will be hard-pressed to find
a defendant who does not experience litigation as a form of attack. In this
sense, modern litigants are much like the Trojans and Achaeans who battled
before Illium in the wake of Agamemnon’s broken covenant.
At this point, we can formulate the central interpretive claim of this
Article: Contractual liability consists of ex ante consent to retaliation in the
event of breach—a retaliation limited and civilized through litigation. The
evolution of contract from the bloody enacted penalty clause of the ancient
covenant ritual to the written penalty clause of the penal bond, and then to
a limited claim for money damages, casts remedy for breach of contract in a
new light. What we see is a gradual limiting of the scope of retaliation in the
event of breach. Among the Trojans and Achaeans, a breach of covenant
gave rise to the right to brutally attack the breaching party and his family.
With the rise of more powerful legal systems, the right of personal recourse
was replaced with a right to proceed against a breaching party in the courts.
The claim of violent retaliation was replaced with a claim for money,
although initially a promisor faced few ex ante limitations on what sort of
financial recourse he could consent to in the event of breach. The rise of
adjudication merely ruled out ex ante consent to violence and replaced it
with consent to a claim for money.
We then see a second process by which the intensity of the recourse was
further limited. In effect, equity and Parliament ruled that any response
prosecuted in the courts could not exceed the value of the bargain lost as a
result of breach. Put another way, rather than seeking to enforce contracts,
contract law in effect continues the ancient ritual of the dismembered goats,
albeit in a civilized and limited form. It replaces the anarchic world of
violence and feuds with a controlled world of civil recourse through the
courts.
III. JUSTIFYING CIVIL RECOURSE
This account of contractual liability is an interpretive theory. It seeks to
uncover something important about the underlying structure of the law that
we currently have and is not offered as a model of what contract law would
be if all was for the best in the “best of all possible worlds.”51 Rather, it has
the more modest goal of revealing an aspect of the underlying normative
logic of the law. An interpretive theory necessarily must pay attention to the
normative logic of the law. Accordingly, it must also examine the extent to
which the law is justified. Some theorists—most dramatically Ronald
Dworkin—claim that a proper understanding of the law must present it as

51. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE OR OPTIMISM 130 (Burton Raffel trans., Yale Univ. Press 2005)
(1759) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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justified by the best possible moral argument.52 Even if one adopts a less
exalted view of the moral possibilities of legal interpretation, a successful
interpretive theory will reveal the law as at least morally plausible.53
Accordingly, this Part puts forward an argument that is meant to justify a
consent to retaliation in the event of breach.
The civil recourse theory sees contract law as facilitating a form of
limited retaliation against breaching parties. While “attack” and “retaliation”
may initially raise moral hackles, ultimately allowing retaliation against
contract breachers is a valuable way to facilitate social cooperation. This
justification for civil recourse, however, is necessarily limited. Indeed, to the
extent that the normative and interpretive case for the civil recourse theory
is successful, it suggests that any comprehensive account of contract law will
necessarily be pluralistic, calling on normative concepts beyond those
embodied in the idea of civil recourse. The civil recourse theory provides an
account of contractual liability and contract remedies; it cannot account for
a host of doctrines such as mistake or the statute of frauds, which necessarily
embody other normative concerns.
A. THE CASE FOR RETALIATION
In the philosophy of tort law, civil recourse theory has been justified by
appeal to a Lockean social contract in which a citizen retains a limited
version of his natural right of “appropriating to himself, the Goods or
Service of the Offender.”54 Because the view of contractual liability offered
here shares with these tort theories an emphasis on a plaintiff’s ability to act
against a defendant through the courts, it seems fair to label it a civil
recourse theory. Such a label, though, carries with it a risk of confusion
because the argument offered for the theory’s application to contractual
liability rests on a very different normative basis than does the theory as
applied to tort law. To understand those differences, it is useful to begin not
with John Locke’s vision of the state of nature, but with the view offered up
by Thomas Hobbes.55

52. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1997) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE]
(laying out Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity at greater length); RONALD DWORKIN, Hard
Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1978) (“I propose . . . the thesis that judicial decisions
in civil cases . . . characteristically are and should be generated by principle and not policy.”).
53. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 13–24 (2004) (discussing strong, moderate,
and weak versions of the justification requirement for theories of contract law).
54. JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285,
292 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1689); see supra note 3 and accompanying
text.
55. To be clear, I am not trying to offer a Hobbesian theory of civil recourse in contrast to
the Lockean theory put forward by Professors Zipursky and Goldberg. I begin with Hobbes
because of the hold that his vision of anarchy has exercised on our thinking, not because my
theory rests on the particular account of natural law and natural rights set forth in Hobbes’s The
Leviathan.
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Hobbes famously claimed that life in the state of nature was “solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”56 By the “state of nature,” Hobbes meant a
world without formal government. His solution to the miserable brutishness
of anarchy was Leviathan, an all-powerful State that could compel obedience
to law.57 The alternative to Leviathan, he insisted, was chaos.58 Few thinkers
today endorse Hobbes’s frank embrace of absolutism, although a strong
assumption continues that Hobbes was correct about anarchy: In the
absence of the State, chaos results.59 History and anthropology, however,
reveal that Hobbes was mistaken on this crucial point. As an empirical
matter, anarchic systems are not chaotic. Rather, they are filled with social
practices that constrain conflict, violence, and predation. The State simply is
not the only solution to the Hobbesian problem of man’s constant
“endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other.”60
For example, one of the most common mechanisms for creating order
in an anarchic system is the feud.61 If a member of tribe A harms a member
of tribe B, then members of tribe B will retaliate against a member of tribe A.
This creates incentives for members of both tribes to avoid predation and to
police misconduct by members of their own tribe. Admittedly, the order
provided by such a system is brittle and can result in a cycle of violence that
is difficult to escape. Most of the time, though, it does not break down.
Indeed, as opposed to the rude and vicious anarchy predicted by Hobbes, in
many societies where feuds govern, elaborate courtesy and hospitality are
the norm.62
Human flourishing, however, requires more than simply the absence of
predation. It also requires that individuals cooperate with one another. In
Hobbes’s vision of the state of nature, anyone foolish enough to enter a
contract makes himself vulnerable to opportunism:

56.
57.
58.
59.

HOBBES, supra note 12, at 89.
See id.
See id.
An example of this presumption’s hold is expressed by the Tenth Circuit:

To empower each individual to decide whether the particular law is worthy or runs
against the individual’s private beliefs would necessarily produce a lawless society
and chaos. Quite apart from the fact of invalidity of such a system, it has no
practical social value. Such a government would fail in a very short time, for carried
to its logical conclusion it is anarchy and revolution.
United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 241 (10th Cir. 1979).
60. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 87.
61. See generally M.J.L. HARDY, BLOOD FEUDS AND THE PAYMENT OF BLOOD MONEY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST (1963) (discussing Arab society’s longstanding customs following instances of
violent death or injury).
62. See FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR 88–90 (1994) (discussing the obligations that
honor culture of the Bedouins imposed on hosts to defend their guests against hostility and
contrasting it with early European norms).
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For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will
performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridel
mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the
feare of some coërcive Power; which in the condition of meer
Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of
their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.63
In a world of simultaneous exchange, of course, contracts are not really
necessary.64 Quid is exchanged for quo, but there is never an executory
obligation to deliver quid or perform quo.65 As soon as the element of time
is introduced, however, the problem becomes more complicated.
Consider an example from Roman history. In 73 B.C.E., Spartacus, a
gladiatorial slave in Capua, led a revolt in which he killed his owner.66 Other
slaves rallied to his cause, and in a short time, he commanded an army of
several thousand soldiers.67 Over a three-year period, Spartacus’s forces
marched from one end of the Italian peninsula to the other, defeating the
Roman legions sent to suppress the revolt.68 Finally, Spartacus was cornered
at Rhegium in the toe of the Italian boot.69 Without a navy, he contracted
with Cilician pirates, who promised to ferry the escaped slaves out of Italy in
exchange for a share of the vast booty of Spartacus’s army.70 Plutarch
records that “after the pirates had struck a bargain with him, and received
his earnest, they deceived him and sailed away.”71 Trapped, the Romans
captured the Spartacan army, and the consul Marcus Licinius Crassus lined
the whole of the Via Appia between Capua and Rome with their crucified
bodies.72

63. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 96.
64. In subsistence economies without common exchanges, however, the social practice of
agreement and trade can be underdeveloped to a surprising degree. In early medieval Iceland,
William Miller writes of “how difficult it might be, in the absence of a market economy and its
accompanying mercantile assumptions, to transact without ill-feeling.” WILLIAM IAN MILLER,
BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND 84 (1990).
65. Of course, this is an oversimplification. Even in a world of purely simultaneous
exchange, disputes can arise out of agreements. For example, if Able exchanges a widget with
Baker for cash, and the widget subsequently proves defective, Baker may complain to Able.
Some mechanism would be necessary to resolve their dispute. Even in a world of caveat emptor,
we would need some rule to tell us that caveat emptor is the standard.
66. See generally BARRY STRAUSS, THE SPARTACUS WAR (2009) (chronicling the story of the
gladiator Spartacus who led a slave rebellion in ancient Rome).
67. Id. at 42–43.
68. Id. at 110.
69. Id. at 132.
70. Id. at 133–34.
71. 3 PLUTARCH, The Life of Crassus, in PLUTARCH’S LIVES 204, 214 (A.H. Clough ed., John
Dryden trans., Cosimo, Inc. 2008) (c. 75 C.E.).
72. SANDRA R. JOSHEL, SLAVERY IN THE ROMAN WORLD 63 (2010).
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Contrary to Hobbes’s claim, there are many ways to solve this problem
without an omnipotent Leviathan.73 In the absence of the State, cooperation
can occur. Norms of reciprocity offer one solution.74 For example, the
Algonquin tribes of northeastern America developed an elaborate system of
customs by which those with personal abundance had an obligation to share
their abundance with family, fellow tribe members, and allies.75 The
recipients of this largess were in turn expected to share out of their
abundance in the future.76 Those who failed to comply with these
reciprocity norms undermined the cohesion and unity of clan and tribe
relationships to the detriment of all of the parties involved.77
Another solution developed in medieval Iceland, where the opposite of
a reciprocity norm occurred.78 Warriors would engage in raids—rán—in
which they would take property from one another.79 The expectation was
that a rán would give rise to either a proportional counter-raid or litigation,
in which the victim of the original rán would demand payment.80 Over time,
a system of exchange, albeit without initial consent, formed.81 Another
naturally occurring strategy encouraging cooperation is the social ostracism
of promise breakers. For example, in the eleventh century, the Maghribi

73. See generally Joseph M. Perillo, Exchange, Contract and Law in the Stone Age, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 17 (1989) (discussing mechanisms used by stateless societies to enforce agreements and
facilitate exchange and cooperation).
74. See generally JACQUES T. GODBOUT IN COLLABORATION WITH ALAIN CAILLE, THE WORLD
OF THE GIFT (Donald Winkler trans., 1998) (discussing the gift’s role in creating social
connections that encourages the recipient to respond in kind); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE
FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES (W.D. Halls trans., W.W. Norton & Co.
1990) (1950) (same); MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (Routledge 2004) (1972)
(discussing the economical implications of gifts during the Stone Age).
75. Richard White describes this system:
Each recipient [of a gift] incurred a reciprocal obligation to the giver thus
ensuring that goods were constantly in motion. Defining what were surplus goods
in this situation—goods beyond the basic needs for subsistence and production—is
difficult, since groups, not individuals, accumulated goods, and possession was so
fluid.
RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES
REGION, 1650–1815, at 101–02 (1995).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 101 (“The distribution of goods created obligation and established status, but
here, in extending alliances and social relationships, Potawatomi leaders neglected existing
internal obligations and eventually fragmented their villages and clans.”).
78. See MILLER, supra note 64, at 84–93 (discussing a case of exchange of resources
through a process of rán, counter rán, and litigation).
79. See id. at 77, 83, 85–86.
80. See id. at 89–91.
81. See id. at 93–102 (discussing the norms governing raiding in medieval Iceland); see also
JAMES F. BROOKS, CAPTIVES & COUSINS: SLAVERY, KINSHIP, AND COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST
BORDERLANDS 3–40 (2002) (arguing that a similar system of limited and quasi-legitimate
raiding existed among American Indian tribes in what became the southwestern United States).
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(Jewish merchants in the Islamic lands of the Mediterranean) developed an
elaborate system of collective shunning to deal with commercial
misbehavior.82 Hostage taking, a standard method of increasing compliance
with ancient treaties, offers yet another solution.83 None of these systems
rely on a Hobbesian Leviathan to provide order and trust.
Notwithstanding such mechanisms, the fate of the Spartacan army
illustrates how any agreement involving executory obligations makes one or
both of the contracting parties vulnerable.84 It leaves both in a classic
prisoner’s dilemma.85 In its simplest form, the prisoner’s dilemma explains
how rationally self-interested parties will always choose to defect, leaving
everyone worse off than they would be in a world where cooperation is
possible.86 Traditionally, scholars have looked to law as a solution to the
dilemma.87 If we have contract law, so goes the argument, Able needn’t
worry about Baker’s defection because once Baker enters into a legally
binding contract, the law will prohibit his defection. This explanation
assumes, however, that contract law enforces contracts—which is not quite
true. The State leaves the question of legal action entirely in the hands of

82. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 528–31 (1993) (discussing the mechanisms
by which long-distance merchants managed the problem of embezzlement by distant agents).
83. See JOEL ALLEN, HOSTAGES AND HOSTAGE-TAKING IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE (2006)
(discussing hostage taking in the ancient world); A.D. Lee, The Role of Hostages in Roman
Diplomacy with Sasanian Persia, 40 HISTORIA: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ALTE GESCHICHTE 366 (1991)
(Ger.) (discussing hostage taking in international diplomacy in the ancient world); M. James
Moscovich, Obsidibus Traditis: Hostages in Caesar’s De Bello Gallico, 75 CLASSICAL J. 122 (1979)
(discussing hostage taking as a means of treaty enforcement during Caesar’s Gallic campaigns).
84. See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY 491–93 (2005)
(discussing the problem of ex post opportunism in contracting).
85. See AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF
GOVERNANCE 14–15 (2004) (discussing the famous hold-up problem faced in executory
contracts). As Dixit notes, “This is like a prisoner’s dilemma except that only the second player
has the opportunity to make an extra private gain, therefore it is often called a one-sided
prisoner’s dilemma.” Id. at 16.
86. See id. at 15 (“[I]n the normal form, (Don’t Invest, Hold Up) is the only Nash
equilibrium; for any other strategy combination, one of the players wants to deviate to a
different strategy.”).
87. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
293, 312 (1992) (“The prisoners’ dilemma is simply a situation in which the costs of bargaining
or of enforcing the resulting contract are very high.”); D.K. Osborne, Cartel Problems, 66 AM.
ECON. REV. 835, 836 (1976) (“A prisoners’ dilemma can be resolved satisfactorily by an
enforceable contract.”); Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127,
128 (1997) (“The prisoners’ dilemma thus vanishes if the prisoners can write an enforceable
contract not to confess.”); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 835 (1995) (“[B]inding, rule-oriented
trade adjudication is an enforcement mechanism by which states solve a multiparty ‘prisoner’s
dilemma’ arising out of trade contracts.” (footnote omitted)).
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the promisee.88 In the absence of plaintiff-initiated litigation, Leviathan is
indifferent to breach of contract. Contract law merely provides a promisee
with a nonviolent and limited ability to retaliate against a promisor through
litigation in the event of breach. Accordingly, the story of contract law as a
simple prohibition on defection must be modified.
Another solution to the prisoner’s dilemma is for disappointed
promisees to retaliate against promise breakers. While the classical
prisoner’s dilemma yields the depressing result of mutual defection when
played as a one-shot game between rational actors, substantial literature
demonstrates that when the game is played repeatedly, cooperation develops
through a strategy of tit-for-tat.89 Each player cooperates until the other
player defects, at which point the nondefecting player retaliates by defecting
in the next round.90 The logic behind the strategy is that Able limits the
probability of Baker’s defection by threatening to punish him should he
defect.91 Ironically, the ability to retaliate provided by a multi-round game
increases the probability of cooperation and thus reduces the likelihood that
retaliation will become necessary.
The problem with the simple tit-for-tat strategy is that it is costly and
requires that parties engage in a series of mutual commitments.92 It cannot
provide for cooperation in one-shot scenarios or where one of the parties
can simply refuse to deal further with the other party.93 One must be able to
retaliate without a second transaction. Consider again the case of Spartacus.
The pirate–admiral was able to break his promise to Spartacus with impunity
because his navy immunized him from retaliation by the Spartacan army.
Ironically, perhaps, it was Spartacus’s inability to retaliate that led to the
breakdown of cooperation, and some mechanism facilitating attacks would
have resulted in greater cooperation (and, one might add, fewer crucified
slaves). On the other hand, as the treaty between Agamemnon and Priam
from The Iliad illustrates, even parties that are violently opposed to one
another can reach agreement when it is possible to credibly threaten the
other party with retaliation in the event of breach.94 There is, thus, a sense

88. See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (discussing the private-law structure of
contract law and the absence of independent state enforcement of contracts).
89. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27–54 (1984)
(explaining success of “tit-for-tat” strategy—e.g., matching the cooperate/defect decision made
by one’s opponent in the previous round—in multi-round prisoner dilemma “tournaments”).
90. Id. at 31.
91. Id. at 36–37.
92. Id. at 37–38.
93. The threat of refusing to deal can itself discipline defection, provided that the returns
on future cooperation are greater than the returns that can be generated from investing the
proceeds of a one-time defection. See DIXIT, supra note 85, at 16–17 (discussing the “grimtrigger strategy”).
94. See HOMER, supra note 13, at 128–44 (discussing a treaty between the Trojans and the
Achaeans).
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in which cooperation depends on the ability to retaliate rather than, as
Hobbes suggests, its complete suppression.
Of course, retaliation may lead to escalating conflict.95 If retaliation
takes the form of self-help violence, as in the case of feuding Icelandic
chieftains or Bronze Age Greeks, the target may fight back. Furthermore, if
the legitimacy of the initial attack is not clearly established, then the natural
reaction of the attacked party’s tribe is to retaliate. The reason is simple: In
an anarchic system, the credible threat of retaliation is the best way to avoid
unprovoked predation. A retaliatory threat is only credible, however, if one
consistently retaliates against apparent wrongs, which is why the strong
culture of honor and vengeance emerged in anarchic societies. Not
surprisingly, these societies developed memorable rituals—such as the
dismembering of goats and dogs—by which retaliation for breach of
contract could be distinguished from simple predation. These rituals were
attempts to reduce, ex ante, the potential level of ex post violence in the
event of retaliation for breach. As we have seen, over time, societies
developed stronger safeguards against the risk of escalating conflict inherent
in encouraging permissible retaliation for breach: the extraction of wealth
replaced bloodier responses; adjudication came to replace self-help, acting
as a gatekeeper to retaliation; and finally, the scope of even monetary
retaliation was limited.96
The shift from self-help and violence to adjudication and money
damages is fairly easy to understand in terms of limiting the potential costs
of retaliation. But while the logic of limitation finds a home within the idea
of civil recourse theory, explaining why expectation damages, rather than
some other amount, should be the upper limit on consented-to retaliation is
less obvious. Limiting consented-to attacks at attacks for expectation
damages ensures that a promisee does not receive more through retaliatory
litigation than he or she would receive through successful cooperation. This

95.

Robert Bates provides the following trenchant summary of the problem:

When the threat of retaliation works, the private provision of coercion can produce
peace, as Evans-Pritchard argued; but the behaviors and beliefs that supply peace
also encourage behavior that increases the likelihood of violence. In such societies,
private warriors populate public places; people bearing arms and intimating their
willingness to employ them strut in the boulevards and cluster in the marketplace.
Public places are populated with provocateurs; where families are honor-bound to
protect their own, hot-tempered youths find protection against the consequences
of brazen behavior. Interactions thus take place in a volatile ambience of honor
and impudence; young hotheads move to the fore; and a culture of machismo
permeates the society. . . . Provocative acts become commonplace—but also
uncommonly dangerous because they can unleash violent reprisals.
ROBERT H. BATES, PROSPERITY AND VIOLENCE 46 (2001).
96. It is also worth noting that as the scope of retaliation was limited and the possibility of
escalation was reduced, the rituals surrounding contract formation have become considerably
less colorful.
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differentiates legitimate retaliation for breach from mere predation. Hence,
Lord Nottingham, writing in the 1690s, articulated equity’s oversight of
penal bonds not in terms of providing just compensation, but in terms of
limiting predation through the courts: “Yet equity will not suffer any advantage
to be taken of this bond beyond the true damnification, and therefore usually
awards an injunction till a trial at law be had either upon an action of
Covenant or upon a special issue quantum damnificatus.”97 Similarly, there is
a difference between a legitimate raid carried out because the target broke a
covenant and a merely predatory raid aimed at carrying off the target’s
wealth.98
In short, rather than completely displacing the world of anarchy, as
Hobbes suggested, contract law tames and limits the anarchic mechanism of
retaliation without repudiating its basic structure. It solves the problem of
opportunism and facilitates the human flourishing made possible by social
cooperation.99 It does this by facilitating retaliation against contract
breachers in ways that prevent retaliation from becoming merely predatory.
B. RECOURSE AND PLURALISM
There is an important sense in which the civil recourse theory is
radically incomplete. Allowing limited retaliation against contract breachers
is desirable because it facilitates cooperation. A system of cooperation based
on retaliation, however, is necessarily brittle, and therefore the scope of
permissible retaliation must be limited. The idea of civil recourse, having
elucidated the nature of contractual liability, tells us comparatively little
about the rest of contract doctrine.
To date, no theory has emerged as a widely accepted interpretation of
all of contract law.100 Rather, differing theories successfully explain
particular doctrines, while failing to explain others.101 Rival theories are able

97. LORD NOTTINGHAM’S ‘MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE’ AND ‘PROLEGOMENA OF
CHANCERY AND EQUITY’ 275 (D.E.C. Yale ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1965) (1673–1675)
(emphasis added).
98. Signaling the difference between these two types of attacks is why the bloody covenant
rituals acknowledging the legitimacy of attack were so important. The point was to keep a
healthy anarchy from degenerating into the mindlessly predatory anarchy envisioned by
Hobbes.
99. This argument, of course, does not rest on the notion that all forms of social
cooperation are good. Indeed, doctrines such as the law’s refusal to recognize illegal or
immoral contracts can be understood as a refusal to facilitate pathological forms of
cooperation.
100. See Nathan B. Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1483–84 (2005) (summarizing the polyphony of contemporary contract theory).
101. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, From Langdell to Law and Economics: Two Conceptions of Stare Decisis
in Contract Law and Theory, 94 VA. L. REV. 157 (2007) (discussing how law and economics and
moral theories of contract seek to explain different features of our legal practices); Nathan B.
Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
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to provide explanation for these neglected doctrines, but often at the price
of discounting those doctrines that the first theory explained.102 For
example, economic theories explain the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale103 as a
penalty default rule;104 but these theories encounter difficulty in explaining
expectation damages.105 Promissory theories are able to account for why the
law should recognize the obligation to keep a contract; but they fail to
explain the doctrine of consideration, which eliminates liability for a whole
class of promises.106 On a broader level, Jody Kraus argues that efficiency
theories provide detailed accounts of the outcomes in contract cases, while
failing to account for the common law’s ex post language of rights and
duties.107 Autonomy theories, he goes on to assert, provide an account of
contract law’s internal language, but fail to yield concrete explanations for
the outcomes in particular cases.108
There are three potential responses to this normative pluralism. On one
hand, we could claim that contract law lacks any internal coherence.109 A
second approach is to continue to search for a unified normative theory that
could account for the bulk of contract doctrine.110 The final approach is to
construct a theory that integrates various normative goals in a coherent
manner.111 A recourse theory is pluralistic in this final sense. As I argue
below, this theory casts light on several contract doctrines that seemed

REV. 829, 843–59 (2007) (discussing the comparative failures and successes of autonomy and
efficiency theories’ explanation of doctrines surrounding contract damages).
102. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 1, at 691–94 (arguing that autonomy theories capture the
language of judicial opinions in contract cases while efficiency theories capture the outcomes in
contract cases).
103. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch.); 9 Ex. 341.
104. See Ian Ayers & Robert Gerner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101–04 (1989) (discussing the holding in Hadley as a
penalty default rule).
105. See Oman, supra note 101, at 851–59.
106. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 29 (1981).
107. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 1, at 690.
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., Peter Alces, Unintelligent Design in Contract Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 505, 508–
09 (arguing that ultimately contract law reflects a series of historical accidents and ad hoc
decisions that lack any underlying conceptual unity).
110. This, for example, is what Randy Barnett claims to have done with his consent theory
of contract, which is similar to Charles Fried’s promise-based theory in its acceptance of liberal
individualism as a basic premise, but which differs from it by jettisoning the concept of
promising. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)
[hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory]; Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1022 (1992).
111. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law: Groundwork for the Reconciliation of
Autonomy and Efficiency, 1 SOC. POL. & LEGAL PHIL. 385 (2002); Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling
Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420
(2001).
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contradictory or anomalous. It would be foolish, however, to claim that the
notion of consent to retaliation lies behind all of contract doctrine. It
provides an account of some of the law’s core structures, but there are many
doctrines that it fails to explain. The strength of the theory lies not in its
ability to account for all strands of contract law, but rather in its ability to
allow other normative principles to account for these doctrines without
contradicting them. The way a civil recourse theory accommodates other
normative concerns can be seen best in the doctrines surrounding remedies,
to which we now turn.
IV. CIVIL RECOURSE AND SOME PUZZLES OF CONTRACT DOCTRINE
The civil recourse theory provides theoretical traction on three puzzles
in the law of contract remedies: the penalty-clause doctrine; limitations on
expectation damages; and the private-law structure of contractual liability.
A. THE PENALTY DOCTRINE
It is black-letter law that a so-called penalty clause is unenforceable.112
Parties are free to specify the amount of money that they must pay in the
event of breach, but the amount chosen must be a reasonable estimate of
one’s actual damages.113 A liquidated-damages clause that exceeds a
reasonable estimate of the parties’ actual expectation damages will be
deemed a penalty clause.114 For many theories, this rule is puzzling.
For autonomy theorists, the penalty doctrine is a stark limitation on
freedom of contract.115 If contracts are to be respected because they
represent the autonomous choices of the parties, then, unless there are
third-party effects, the law ought to be indifferent as to the substantive
content of agreements.116 This content is a matter for the parties to decide,
and for the State to restrict or second guess if the choices of private parties
fail to show them the respect that they are due. Granted, some promissory
theorists, such as Seana Shiffrin, question whether one can make a promise
that contemplates its own breach, but this argument suggests that contract
law should reject not only the penalty doctrine, but the entire notion of
liquidated damages.117 But for those who ground contracts in promissory
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (setting forth the penaltyclause doctrine).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts, 43 AM.
J. COMP. L. 427, 433 (1995) (“The coherence of penalty clauses ban with the underlying
philosophy of freedom of contract is questionable, and the issue is frequently raised both in
judicial opinion and in the academic literature.”).
116. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 110, at 286; FRIED, supra note 106, at 105;
SMITH, supra note 53, at 246–47.
117. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV.
708, 734–36 (2007).
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morality or the autonomy of citizens in a liberal polity, the penalty doctrine
constitutes an interpretive embarrassment.
Economic theorists, who place a premium on the value of private
ordering, likewise have difficulty accounting for the penalty doctrine.
Initially, the theory of efficient breach seems to suggest that penalty clauses
are undesirable because they overincentivize performance.118 From an
economic point of view, there is nothing per se efficient about the
performance of contracts—rather, the parties should perform only when the
benefits of performance outweigh its costs.119 Penalty clauses appear to
incentivize performance even when the costs of breach outweigh the
benefits of performance. This apparently neat explanation, however, holds
true only if the costs of renegotiation are high. It falls apart once the
possibility of ex post renegotiation emerges.120 If a promisor can realize
greater returns from breach than performance will realize for a promisee,
he can always bargain for a release from his obligations by offering the
promisee part of the upside profit from breach. In effect, a promisor can
threaten, “Agree to release me, or else I will perform and you won’t be able
to capture any of the benefits from my breach.” Indeed, because penalty
clauses commit the promisor to sharing a larger portion of the surplus
created by breach opportunities ex post, they may provide an efficient ex
ante bargaining tool for promisors who wish to credibly commit to dividing
such a surplus with promisees.121
One might try to justify the rule on the ground that it protects
contracting parties from inconsiderately imposing crushing liability on
themselves in the event of breach.122 For example, some scholars have
pointed to the experimental results of behavioral decision theorists, which
suggest that humans are prone to systematic errors in how they assess the
risk of unlikely events such as breach of contract.123 Accordingly, courts’
willingness to vigilantly police liquidated-damages clauses can be justified by

118. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 31–34 (2d
ed. 1989) (detailing why the expectation remedy leads to an efficient outcome in breach-ofcontract cases).
119. See id.
120. See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988) (arguing that, given the possibility of renegotiation ex
post, there is no reason to suppose that expectation damages represent a uniquely efficient way
of internalizing the costs of breach).
121. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 260–61 (5th ed. 2007).
122. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J.) (“On this view the refusal to enforce penalty clauses is (at best) paternalistic—and it
seems odd that courts should display parental solicitude for large corporations.”).
123. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995).
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the need to protect people from their faulty assessments of the risk of paying
a penalty.124
The problem with this interpretation of the doctrine is that it cannot
explain why penalty clauses are singled out for special monitoring.125 After
all, the behavioralist research suggests that people are likely to inaccurately
assess the risks associated with events other than contract breach; yet the law
normally does not inquire into the substance of contractual terms. For
example, if A loans B $10 to be repaid with ten percent interest in one year,
the penalty doctrine would disallow a clause requiring the payment of a
fairly trivial additional sum—say $50—if B failed to tender the $11 as
promised.126 It is difficult to see why the law should protect parties from the
decision to enter into such relatively harmless agreements. Alternatively,
suppose that A loaned an enormous sum of money to B, so enormous that B
had little hope of repaying it. Absent fraud or unconscionability, such a
contract is legally unobjectionable.127 The penalty-clause doctrine thus
seems, at best, a ham-fisted attempt at paternalism.128
In contrast, a civil recourse theory of contractual liability has a simple
explanation for the penalty doctrine: Law exists in part to limit the ability of
parties to engage in predation against one another. This does not mean that
the law eliminates any ability to retaliate against wrongs. Rather, the law
civilizes recourse by replacing private violence with private litigation and
limiting satisfaction to the extraction of wealth from the party in the
wrong.129 Consider again the covenant between Agamemnon and Priam

124.

Robert Hillman has written:
These cognitive phenomena and the predictions they generate about contract
parties’ decision making both help to explain the judicial response to liquidated
damages provisions and tend to confirm the appropriateness of the current
aggressive judicial approach to the issue. The parties view contract breakdown as a
remote possibility, fail to focus on it, and, to the extent that they do think about
breach, seek a fair remedial package. Because of the lack of paradigmatic
bargaining with respect to liquidated damages provisions and because of their
potential, due to unanticipated circumstances, to generate penalties and windfalls
contrary to the parties’ intentions, courts do and should enthusiastically police
liquidated damages provisions.

Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liquidated
Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 732 (2000).
125. See id. at 735 (“[W]hy should judges single out liquidated damages for this treatment?
What contract term would be safe from this attack? Aggressive use of this reasoning to question
contract enforceability could therefore undermine contract law’s goals of certainty and
predictability, which may be better served by the traditional objective theory of assent.”).
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 365 cmt. a (1981).
127. See id. §§ 162, 208.
128. See Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J.) (“[S]ince little effort is made to prevent businessmen from assuming risks, these
reasons are no better than makeweights.”).
129. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 3.
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before the walls of Ilium. The parties consented that in the event of breach
their throats could be slit, their children enslaved, and their wives raped.130
The agreement is barbarous and unjust, but the injustice does not reside in
the fact that the promisor consented to attack in the event of breach. The
barbarity of the agreement lies in the excessive nature of the attack. The
advent of contract law wrought the improvement of limiting recourse to
retaliation that is proportionate to the wrong inflicted. The law does not
allow a party to consent to a disproportionate response because the
establishment of a system of private law was fueled by a desire to limit the
scope and violence of recourse in the face of wrongs.131
This account is consistent with two other aspects of the penalty
doctrine. First, the civil recourse doctrine does not work in reverse. The law
will not honor a liquidated-damages clause that exceeds the value of what
was promised; but there is no objection to clauses that limit recourse to less
than expectation damages in the event of breach.132 In effect, parties may
declare that they will be satisfied with recourse at less than the full value of
what was promised to them.133 Such subcompensatory recourse is not
excessive, and therefore is unobjectionable. Indeed, parties are free to
disclaim all rights to recourse ex ante by agreeing to otherwise valid
contracts that contain clauses disclaiming that they are legally
enforceable.134
Second, the doctrine does not sweep into its ambit true option
contracts, in which parties agree ex ante on a price for the purchase of a
release from certain obligations. For instance, so-called pay-or-play contracts
are quite common in the film industry, and are routinely honored by the
courts.135 Under these contracts, an actor is promised a fixed sum of
money—say $1 million—in return for the actor’s promise to perform in or
refrain from performing in a contemplated film at the movie studio’s
130. See HOMER, supra note 13, at 128–44.
131. See LOCKE, supra note 54, at 324; Goldberg, Constitutional Status, supra note 3, at 602
(arguing that allowing civil recourse for tort actions limits the cycle of escalating violence and
vengeance that would result from extra-legal recourse); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 3, at
736 (“Indeed, an earmark of our civil legal system is that it does not involve violent remedies,
but civil remedies; it does not involve punishment.”).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. d (“A term that fixes as
damages an amount that is unreasonably small does not come within the rule stated in this
Section, but a court may refuse to enforce it as unconscionable under the rule stated in
§ 208.”).
133. See Rose & Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton & Bros., [1925] A.C. 445 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from Eng.) (holding that courts should honor an agreement expressly disclaiming a right to
recourse to damages in the event of breach).
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1988)
(“The contract included a standard ‘pay or play’ clause, under which the studio could
terminate Welch from the film at any time, but was obligated to pay her the full contract price,
unless she failed to fulfill her contractual obligations.”), vacated, 782 P.2d 594 (Cal. 1989).
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discretion.136 If the studio and the actor instead entered into a bilateral
contract where the actor promised to act and the studio promised to hire
the actor for a film at the rate of $1 million, a $1 million liquidated-damages
clause could well be deemed a penalty clause.137 The actor would have a
duty to mitigate his damages by finding another role, and in any case his
claim for the lost $1 million under the contract would be offset by the
amount saved—in this case, the cost of performing in the movie—as a result
of the breach.138
From a purely economic point of view, there is no distinction between
the pay-or-play agreement and the liquidated-damages clause. Both are
options. In contrast, the legal distinction makes sense if the aim of the
penalty doctrine is to limit retaliation. The $1 million pay-or-play clause is
not meant as recourse in the event of breach; indeed, in refusing to make
the movie and tendering $1 million, the studio fully performs its contractual
obligations, and there is no breach. On the other hand, when the clause is
meant to specify the recourse to be allowed in the event of breach, then the
law limits recourse to proportionate damages.
B. LIMITATIONS ON EXPECTATION DAMAGES
In a sense, the modern philosophy of contract law begins with the
question of expectation damages, famously posed in Lon Fuller and William
R. Perdue’s article, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.139 For Fuller and
Perdue, the mystery was why the law should award expectation damages
rather than reliance damages.140 Their answer was a rather convoluted story
about how expectation damages were the most effective way to protect
reliance.141 Modern promissory theorists, however, have offered a more
straightforward account: Expectation damages “enforce” contracts by giving
to the promisee the value of what was promised.142 Indeed, Melvin
Eisenberg has made a powerful empirical argument that, in most cases,

136. See Victor P. Goldberg, Bloomer Girl Revisited or How To Frame an Unmade Picture, 1998
WIS. L. REV. 1051, 1070–82 (discussing pay-or-play clauses in Hollywood contracts).
137. See Lynch v. CIBY 2000, No. CV 97-9022, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23496, at *3 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 13, 1998) (refusing to rule a pay-or-play clause a penalty clause because the plaintiff
chose one of two options for performance rather than breaching).
138. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
139. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46
YALE L.J. 52, 52–53 (1936).
140. See id. at 53.
141. See id. at 73–75.
142. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 106, at 21–27 (arguing that the enforcement of promises
requires either specific performance or the rendering of an amount equivalent to the promised
performance). But see Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F.
1 (2007), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/cfried.pdf (arguing that the
promissory theory of contract need not imply a preference for specific performance).
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expectation damages constitute a kind of virtual specific performance.143
Alternatively, one might argue for expectation damages on the grounds of
corrective justice, as Peter Benson, Curtis Bridgeman, and Andrew Gold
have done.144 Finally, of course, the theory of efficient breach seems to
explain expectation damages as forcing promisors to fully internalize the
costs of breach.145
Regardless of what one makes of the merits of any of these
arguments,146 they all suffer from a basic problem: The law seldom awards
full expectation damages.147 A host of doctrines ensure that the actual
damages awarded to any plaintiff will be less than the value of her
expectancy. First, at least under American law, parties must bear their own
legal expenses, which means that in the absence of an attorney’s fee clause,
a plaintiff will always be undercompensated for the full value of her
contractual expectation.148 Second, damages may only be recovered where
they can be calculated with certainty.149 Real, but uncertain, losses receive
no compensation beyond nominal damages.150 Third, under the rule in
Hadley v. Baxendale, consequential damages are sharply limited.151 Those
damages that are not foreseeable at the time of breach are not recoverable
unless they are specially communicated at the time of contract formation.152
In at least some jurisdictions, additional consequential damages must also be
143. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient
Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 978 (2005) (arguing
that damage awards in most cases operate as a form of virtual specific performance by allowing
promises to recover through the market).
144. See Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of
Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1149 (1989); Peter
Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1675–76 (2007); Peter
Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273, 291
(1995); Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3028–31 (2007); Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009). Indeed, elsewhere I have myself suggested that corrective justice
offered a justification for expectation damages. See Oman, supra note 101, at 844.
145. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 118, at 31–34 (detailing why the expectation remedy
leads to an efficient outcome in breach-of-contract cases).
146. And there is reason to be skeptical of all of them. See SMITH, supra note 53, at 409–13
(discussing the shortcomings of autonomy and transfer accounts of expectation damages);
Oman, supra note 101, at 851–53 (discussing the shortcomings of efficiency theories of
expectation damages).
147. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 507 (2002) (“[C]ontracts
people continue to report that the goal of expectancy damages is to make injured parties
whole. The reality is dramatically different. A large set of remedial rules often limits the
recovery of injured parties to well below expectancy.” (footnote omitted)).
148. See Richmond Am. Homes of Colo., Inc. v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 656, 673 (2008);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352.
150. See id.
151. See id. § 351.
152. See id.
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specially agreed to ex ante.153 Fourth, in the event of a promisor’s breach, a
promisee has a duty to mitigate her damages.154 She must make reasonable
efforts to limit the amount that the promisor must pay.155 Failure to do so
results in a reduction of any claim for damages.156 These limitations present
problems for any theory that takes full expectation damages as the correct
remedy for breach because they ensure that full expectation damages are
virtually never paid.157
As a doctrinal matter, it thus makes more sense to think of expectation
damages as a limitation on awards rather than an entitlement in the event of
breach. The point is most powerfully illustrated by contemporary doctrine’s
treatment of claims for reliance damages. According to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, reliance damages are available as an alternative
measure for recovery.158 As a practical matter, plaintiffs are likely to seek
reliance damages in those cases where the reliance measure would yield a
larger recovery than expectation damages—for example, where a promisee
makes a losing contract that the promisor then serendipitously breaches.159
Courts (and the Restatement), however, have been unsympathetic to
plaintiffs who attempt to recover the full value of their reliance on a losing
contract.160 Rather, defendants are allowed to provide evidence of what the
plaintiff would have lost had the contract been performed, and any award
will then be reduced by these avoided costs.161 The result is that the
expectation measure—when it can be determined—operates as an effective
limit on the amount of reliance damages that can be recovered.162
The structure of expectation damages must be viewed in light of the
previously discussed limiting doctrines. Requirements of certainty,
limitations on consequential damages, and the like all serve to cabin the
recourse available to promisees against breaching promisors.163 The

153. See, e.g., Morrow v. First Nat’l Bank of Hot Springs, 550 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. 1977)
(adopting the tacit-agreement version of the Hadley rule).
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Oman, supra note 101, at 872 (noting that due to the limitations on damages, full
expectation damages are virtually never awarded).
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349.
159. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.16, at 805–08 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing
the situations in which plaintiffs generally ask for reliance damages rather than expectation
damages).
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349.
161. See id.
162. See Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1755, 1772 (arguing that the availability of reliance damages simply shifts the burden of proof
and that expectation damages operate as an upper limit on recovery).
163. See supra notes 147–57 and accompanying text (summarizing the various doctrinal
limitations on full expectation damages).

A3 - OMAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

560

12/15/2010 9:24 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:529

expectation measure, rather than providing the value of an entitlement,
represents an upper limit on recovery. The actual amount that a plaintiff
can recover may in practice be considerably less than the full value of his
expectation interest. Indeed, plaintiffs are free to sue and ask courts for less
than the value of their full expectation damages, and they frequently do so.
There is no impediment to such suits. Rather, claims for damages are
disallowed when they exceed the expectation measure or fall within one of
the other limiting doctrines discussed above. The virtue of the civil recourse
theory is that it sees damages in terms of limited retaliation, rather than in
terms of compensation for a lost right. Accordingly, the logic of expectation
as limit runs with the grain of the theory rather than against it.
C. THE PRIVATE-LAW STRUCTURE OF CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
The civil recourse theory also provides an explanation for the basic,
private-law structure of contractual liability.164 This structure consists of two
features: bilateralism and private standing. Bilateralism means that damages
in private litigation always pass from the defendant to the plaintiff.165 Private
standing means that rather than having a state official independently
enforce contracts, the law waits for disappointed promisees to bring suits.166
In the absence of a decision by the promisee to proceed against the
promisor, nothing happens. Both of these features present challenges for
the dominant theories of contract law, and both are explained by the civil
recourse theory.
Economic theories claim that damages exist to internalize the costs of
breach.167 Ideally, this aligns the promisor’s private incentives with society’s
164. While over the course of the twentieth century the distinction between private law and
public law fell into disfavor, of late there have been dissenters from this dominant consensus.
Most radically, Ernest Weinrib has argued for the complete autonomy of private law. “The
purpose of private law,” he writes enigmatically, “is to be private law.” ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5 (1995). Even theorists such as Jules Coleman and Benjamin Zipursky,
who reject Weinrib’s full-throated formalism in favor of what they label pragmatism, have
insisted that private law has a distinctive formal structure for which any adequate theory must
account. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 3–12 (2003); Benjamin Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL
THEORY 457, 458–59 (2000). All of these theorists have focused their attention on tort law, but
the basic structures that they identify are equally present in contract cases, even if this fact has
attracted little attention among contract theorists. But see, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of
Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118, 170–84 (Peter Benson ed., 2001)
(discussing the bilateral structure of contract law); Oman, supra note 101, at 851–59 (noting
that economic theories of contract damages fail to account for the bilateral structure of
contract law). Their account of private law’s structure has focused on two key features discussed
in the text.
165. See Oman, supra note 101, at 846–51 (discussing bilateralism).
166. See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 164, at 458 (discussing the plaintiff-centric nature of
private-law actions).
167. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 121, at 208–12 (arguing that contract damages serve
to internalize the costs of breach).
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collective interests.168 If damages incentivize promisors, however, there is no
reason to pay them to promisees. The incentive for the promisor would be
identical whether the damages were thrown down a rat hole or given to the
government. Bilateralism is economically perverse.169 Damages provide
promisees with insurance against breach.170 This creates a moral hazard by
encouraging overreliance on promisors’ commitments.171 Ideally, a system
would perfectly incentivize efficient performance, and the promisee would
make reliance decisions purely on the basis of the likelihood of performance
and not the availability of compensation through damages in the event of
breach.172 Moral theories do not fare better. Consider Charles Fried’s
argument that the law of contracts tracks the morality of promising.173 This
claim fails to explain why the law should enforce promises by forcing
promisors to pay promisees instead of simply punishing breach with a fine or
some other sanction. The idea of promise making does not seem to have
anything to say about the choice between a regime of criminal sanctions and
one of private lawsuits.174

168. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 118, at 31–34 (detailing the argument why the
expectation remedy leads to an efficient outcome in breach-of-contract cases).
169. See Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under
Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98, 98 (1996) (discussing the phenomenon of
expectation damages causing overinvestment); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups,
Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478, 487–91 (1996)
(offering economic proof that expectation damages do not promote efficiency); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON. 691, 693 (1983)
(arguing that without reliance, the rule of law produces damages that are not Pareto optimal);
William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 39, 47–48 (1984) (noting that expectation and reliance damages produce inefficient
results); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 472 (1980)
(discussing the problems of breach in reaching Pareto efficiency); Steven Shavell, The Design of
Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121, 124–27 (1984) (describing the relationship
between efficient breach and the Pareto efficient production contract).
170. See Oman, supra note 101, at 852–53. Put another way, because the promisee can
count on compensation through damages in the event of breach, she will engage in investment
based on the expectation of performance in cases when the probability of performance does
not justify such investment. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 121, at 269–73.
171. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 121, at 269–73.
172. See POLINSKY, supra note 118, at 36–41. So long as damages pass from defendants to
plaintiffs, avoiding overreliance by reducing recovery will overincentivize breach, while avoiding
the over-incentivizing breach by allowing recovery will over-incentivize reliance. See Oman, supra
note 101, at 853.
173. See FRIED, supra note 106, at 14–17.
174. Cf. Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88
MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–91 (1989) (arguing that promissory theories of contract have nothing
to say about the content of contract law’s default rules). One cannot object that promissory
commitments are less important and, therefore, do not merit criminal enforcement. It is
possible to calibrate the sanction for breach by simply providing a smaller sanction. Not all
crimes are major evils. Rather, the criminal law simply punishes minor evils with minor
sanctions.

A3 - OMAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

562

12/15/2010 9:24 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:529

It seems initially plausible to justify private standing on practical
grounds. There are many breaches of contract, and it would be difficult and
expensive for government prosecutors to acquire information about such
breaches.175 The law thus empowers plaintiffs to act as private attorneys
general and incentivizes them with damage payments.176 On this view, the
promisee is like the whistleblower in a qui tam action who receives a bounty
in return for bringing an action that vindicates social policy.177 Under
efficiency theories, plaintiffs are enlisted to incentivize optimal
performance, while under moral theories, plaintiffs serve as enforcers of the
obligation to perform one’s promises.178 This pragmatic argument, however,
cannot explain the odd fact that only the promisee (or a third-party
beneficiary) may bring an action for breach of contract.179 If private
standing were simply a diffuse method of enforcement, anyone who
happens to have information regarding a breach ought to be able to bring
suit. Indeed, in whistleblower actions the only connection that the plaintiff
must have to the defendant is knowledge of wrongdoing.180 There is no
requirement that the plaintiff be in privity.181 But this is not the case in
contract actions.
The civil recourse theory accounts for both private standing and
bilateralism because it does not view contractual liability as the enforcement
of some underlying moral duty or as the creation of optimal incentives by
the State. It sees contractual liability as the civilization of what is at its core
an anarchic system of self-help. If contracts consist of consent to retaliation
in the event of breach, the plaintiff-centered system of private standing
makes sense. The legal system waits on the plaintiff’s decision to sue because
it is not ultimately organized to enforce contracts in some abstract or
absolute sense. Rather, it serves to facilitate the private retaliation of the
disappointed promisee against the promisor. Others who might have the
information necessary to press a successful suit are not allowed to sue on the

175. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 141 tbl.C-2 (2010), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf
(reporting over one thousand contract-dispute actions pending in only the federal courts).
176. See Oman, supra note 101, at 848–49.
177. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006) (providing the procedure by which qui tam recoveries
are divided between the government and the qui tam plaintiff).
178. In the case of corrective-justice theories, discussed supra note 144 and accompanying
text, plaintiffs substitute for prosecutors, punishing breaching promisors who fail to carry out
their duties of repair.
179. See Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581, 584 (6th Cir. 1972) (“Ohio has no
remedy for and does not recognize an action in contract absent privity . . . .”)
180. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
181. See United States ex rel. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that a qui tam plaintiff only has standing as a representative of the government and
that “only the government has a dog in the fight”).
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contract because the promisor never consented to retaliation by a third
party in the event of breach. This can be seen most clearly in the law’s
treatment of third-party beneficiaries. Under limited circumstances, third
parties may sue on the contract, but the touchstone of a third party’s
potential standing is the promisor’s and promisee’s intent.182 If both parties
agree that the third party shall not have standing, that party cannot sue,
even if he or she is the contract’s intended beneficiary.183
Bilateralism can also be explained by the logic of limiting retaliation. In
its rawest form in the ancient world, recourse following a breach took the
form of bloody attacks on life and limb. What makes the civil recourse
theory civil is that recourse has been limited and civilized. Promisors cannot
consent to bloody retaliation that poses the danger of escalation and
violence; they are limited to consenting to attacks upon their wealth. When a
disappointed promisee brings suit against a breaching promisor, the money
passes from promisor to promisee because while the promisor consented to
monetary retaliation in the event of breach, he only consented to retaliation
by the promisee. The money is paid only to the promisee because no one
else has a claim upon it, and indeed, for a third party to make such a claim
would effectively amount to predation through the courts. Again, the case of
third-party beneficiaries is the exception that shows the structure of the rule.
In cases where someone other than the promisee may extract wealth in the
event of breach, it is because the law deems the parties have implicitly
consented to the third party’s standing.
V. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS
There are at least three objections against the recourse theory of
contract. The first is normative. Although an interpretive theory need not
ultimately persuade us that current law is “all for the best in the best of all
possible worlds,” it should at least be morally plausible; and this Article’s
argument seems to rest on the valorization of revenge and retaliation, which
are morally objectionable. Second, the recourse theory is apparently
inconsistent with the language that judges use when justifying legal

182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) (“A promise in a contract
creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the
intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.”); see also Reaugh v. Inner Harbour Hosp., Ltd., 447
S.E.2d 617, 620 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (“The remedies available to the beneficiary are exactly the
same as would be available to him if he were a contractual promisee of the performance in
question.”).
183. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 17.3, at 580 (6th ed.
2009) (“However, if the parties explicitly agree that a third party shall have an enforceable right
(or defense), their express agreement will be given effect. Similarly, if their agreement states
that no third party will have an enforceable right, that express intent will be honored.”
(footnote omitted)); see, e.g., City of Olean v. N.Y. State Envtl. Facilities Corp., 625 N.Y.S.2d 775
(App. Div. 1995) (holding that contracts can expressly prohibit enforcement by third-party
beneficiaries).
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outcomes. Accordingly, it seems to make the implausible assumption that
these very sophisticated actors are systematically mistaken about what they
do. Finally, despite this Article’s earlier concession that the recourse theory
is not meant to explain all of contract law, it does seem flatly inconsistent
with the doctrines surrounding contract formation. This matters because
while the theory does not offer a comprehensive explanation, it does offer
an account of contract formation—namely, consent to retaliation in the
event of breach—that current doctrine seems to reject. This Part addresses
and meets these objections.
A. THE NORMATIVE OBJECTION
The link between recourse and retaliation makes some theorists queasy.
John Finnis has rejected civil recourse theories, writing:
At its root the theory of recourse treats as worthy the emotional
impulse of a victim of wrongdoing to ‘get even’, by ‘act[ing]
against’—having recourse against—the rights-violator. This impulse
is in most if not all respects contrary to the true principle, do not
answer injury with injury.184
Most civil recourse theorists, for their part, have been eager to distance the
idea of recourse from revenge and mere retaliation. John C.P. Goldberg and
Benjamin Zipursky, for example, sheepishly concede that their theory might
appear “archaic or barbaric because it links torts to vengeance or
retaliation,” but deny that they defend revenge.185 In a philosophical tour de
force, Jason Solomon has tried to meet Finnis’s objection head on, setting
forth an elaborate justification for why one might legitimately feel aggrieved
in the face of harm caused by another’s wrongdoing and act accordingly.186
Finnis’s objection, however, misidentifies what is at stake in retaliation.
Under this Article’s version of civil recourse, the purpose of moving against
a breaching promisor is not to vindicate one’s aggrieved feelings. Nor is it a
matter of retribution—extracting one’s pound of flesh in a gleeful bit of
revenge against an enemy. Rather, retaliation—the bloody-minded rhetoric
of Homer notwithstanding—is a solution to a problem of social
coordination. The goal is not vindication, but cooperation. Admittedly, the
cooperation facilitated by recourse against contract breachers represents a
184. Finnis, supra note 3, at 57 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). Finnis has not
been alone in accusing recourse theorists of exalting revenge. See, e.g., Jason M. Solomon,
Judging Plaintiffs, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1794 (2007) (“Drawing primarily on Locke and
Blackstone, the recourse theorists point to the transition from the ‘state of nature’ to the liberal
state and embrace tort law’s roots as a substitute for private vengeance.”).
185. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625,
1644 (2002).
186. See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1766
(2009) (arguing for the legitimacy of recourse based on the notion of the second-person
standpoint in moral philosophy).
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thin and potentially impersonal relationship. Yet such relationships are
vitally important in creating prosperous societies.187 Such thin relationships
can also provide the basis for a deeper human flourishing beyond mere
material prosperity. As Finnis himself has written, “Many relationships
initiated merely for business and private need or advantage, or for play and
individual pleasure, ripen into relationships of more or less intense
friendship.”188 A defense of recourse need not ultimately resolve the
question of why social cooperation is desirable;189 so long as one is willing to
concede its desirability, the credible threat of retaliation can be a key
element in generating the trust necessary for such cooperation.190 Ironically,
creating a system that allows retaliation against breaching parties is a way of

187.

See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS & BARRY R. WEINGAST, VIOLENCE

AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY

113 (2009) (“[A]ll open access orders [i.e., prosperous and stable modern democracies] are,
largely, impersonal. . . . Economies in these states are also characterized by impersonal
exchange.”). Another author explains:
The lack of legal property thus explains why citizens in developing and former
communist nations cannot make profitable contracts with strangers, cannot get
credit, insurance, or utilities services: They have no property to lose. Because they
have no property to lose, they are taken seriously as contracting parties only by
their immediate family and neighbors. People with nothing to lose are trapped in
the grubby basement of the precapitalist world.
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 56 (2000).
188. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 142 (1980).
189. Of course, believing that social cooperation is valuable does not imply that all
cooperation is valuable. Criminal conspiracies, for example, may show high levels of
cooperation—cooperation that makes them more, rather than less, pernicious. Contract
doctrine, however, is sensitive to such concerns, refusing to enforce illegal contracts or
agreements in furtherance of an immoral purpose. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 159–179 (1981) (voiding contracts on the grounds of misrepresentation, duress, and
illegality).
190. There is an irony in the way that retaliation fosters cooperation—an irony that seems
embedded in the structure of markets more generally. Hence, Jules Coleman has written:
Markets require contracting or exchange. Exchange is threatened by uncertainty.
Uncertainty can be reduced by factors that are endogenous to the relationship
between the parties. For example, if potential contractors are involved in repeat
play or are members of closely knit communities, then their incentives to defect
from transactions will be reduced by reputation effects. But in these sorts of
circumstances, pure markets are not as important to social stability as they
otherwise would be. For example, we would not think that a family needs to
organize itself as a “market” in order to make allocation decisions. And here is the
problem: Under precisely those circumstances where markets are most desirable
from the point of view of social stability, they are most difficult to create and
sustain, whereas in those circumstances most conducive to low-cost market
interaction, because of their impersonality, markets may well be less desirable
forms of social organization.
JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 68–69 (1992).

A3 - OMAN.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

566

12/15/2010 9:24 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:529

increasing cooperation so that such attacks become less and less
necessary.191
Contract law in its current form emerged out of the tension between
the need to allow retaliation to facilitate cooperation and the need to limit
the scope of that retaliation so that it does not threaten the general peace of
society.192 It accomplished this by channeling retaliatory attacks into the
legal system. In place of self-help violence, with its explosive potential for
escalation, we have the bloodless tourney of lawyers. This reduces the
potentially disruptive force of retaliation in three ways. First, it eliminates
violence as a means of retaliation. Bloodshed is replaced by debts, debts that
can be violently satisfied only by a sheriff or marshal through the tightly
controlled procedure of a writ of fieri facias. Second, it makes a third party
(the court) the gatekeeper for retaliation. This both increases the perceived
legitimacy of the plaintiff’s attack and limits the possibility of excessive,
emotional, or predatory retaliation.193 Finally, it caps the level of permissible
retaliation at the value of the promised performance. The result is a system
of retaliation, but one that has been civilized and controlled.194
B. THE TRANSPARENCY OBJECTION
The recourse theory seems inconsistent with the language that
common-law judges use in deciding contract cases. Because the theory is
offered as an interpretive account of the law, it seems a major objection that
it does not take seriously the reasons judges offer when justifying why a
plaintiff or defendant wins a lawsuit. Surely, one might argue, a theory that
purports to explain the underlying structure of the law must account for this
language. Alternatively, if the theory explicitly or implicitly asserts that
judges are systematically mistaken about the reasons behind their decisions,
this surely counts as an objection to the interpretation. After all, it seems
unlikely that judges could be so ill-informed about their own practices. This
objection can be met in at least three ways. The first is to deny that judicial

191. See, e.g., BATES, supra note 95, at 45 (“The very readiness of the Nuer [a tribe in the
southern Sudan without any formal system of law enforcement] to employ violence provides a
reason, then, that violence so rarely takes place.”). Bates clearly notes that “[t]he security [the
norms of feuding and retaliation] supply to the producers and accumulators of wealth is
fragile.” Id. at 48.
192. Cf. Goldberg, Constitutional Status, supra note 3, at 602–03 (arguing that allowing civil
recourse for tort actions limits the cycle of escalating violence and vengeance that would result
from extra-legal recourse).
193. Such excessive, emotional, and predatory retaliation is, of course, a staple of the epic
literature depicting the more anarchic worlds. Homer’s The Iliad famously opens with the rage
of Achilles, and the danger of feuds spinning out of control is a repeated theme in the
Icelandic sagas. HOMER, supra note 13, at 77.
194. Cf. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 3, at 736 (“Indeed, an earmark of our civil legal
system is that it does not involve violent remedies, but civil remedies; it does not involve
punishment.”).
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language places strong constraints on interpretive theories. The second is to
argue that judges actually do use language that is consistent with the
recourse theory. The third is to note that the language of rights and
obligations in judicial opinions refers to legal rights and obligations, not to
the structure of the moral arguments that justify those rights and
obligations.
According to an important strand of thinking, the common law
presents itself as a transparent practice. The reasons offered by judges are
meant to be the real reasons for the decisions that they reach. As Stephen
Smith puts the point: “The theorist’s explanation of the law must show why
the legal concepts employed by a judge are an appropriate way of expressing
in practice the broader concepts that the theorist argues underlie the law. A
good theory, on this view, works through, rather than around, judicial
reasoning.”195 If we take transparency as a criterion for a successful
interpretive theory, the civil recourse argument seems open to at least two
objections. The first is that judges frequently explain expectation damages
in terms of compensating plaintiffs for the value of their lost bargains.196
The purpose, they aver, is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he or
she would have been in had the contract been performed.197 The civil
recourse theory, in contrast, suggests that damages are not primarily
compensatory. Rather, expectation damages serve only as an upper limit on
recovery. To the extent that they are compensatory, they are accidentally so;
compensation is not the ultimate purpose of expectation damages. Yet
judges do not seem to use the language of limits and boundaries in justifying
their decisions.
The second transparency objection is that judges speak as though
contracts create affirmative obligations to perform, rather than simply
marking the defendant’s consent to retaliation in the event of breach.198
The recourse theory, however, seems to reduce the notion of contract to its
remedy. The objection here is analogous to that often raised against Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s famous option theory of contract. According to
Holmes, “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”199 The

195. SMITH, supra note 53, at 27.
196. See, e.g., Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 427 S.E.2d 363, 366 (Va. 1993) (“The
remedy for breach of contract is intended to put the injured party in the same position in which
it would have been had the contract been performed.”).
197. See id.
198. See, e.g., Pollock v. D.R. Horton, Inc.-Portland, 77 P.3d 1120, 1127 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(noting “each party’s obligation to perform the contract . . . in a way that will effectuate the
objectively reasonable contractual expectations of the parties”).
199. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). Holmes made
the same point in The Common Law, writing:
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language used by judges, however, is much richer, implying that contracts—
like promises—ought to be performed.200 On this view, the civil recourse
theory, like the Holmesian theory, offers too impoverished a view of
contractual obligation.
The transparency objection can be met in a number of ways. The first,
and perhaps least satisfactory answer, is simply to concede that the recourse
theory does not account for the language used by judges. No theory of a
practice can account for its every facet—indeed, one of the purposes of a
theory is to reveal latent or hidden structures, and so by definition an
illuminating theory will necessarily diverge from our common-sense
understanding of the law. Even if one acknowledges the inability to account
for judicial language as a failure, one might believe the advantages gained in
terms of structural insight justify the sacrifice. One could insist that we must
account for contractual liability in terms of its actual social function,
regardless of judicial language. One is necessarily left with the problem of
judges who seem systematically mistaken about the function of the practice
that they engage in day in and day out, but this is not so damning a
conclusion as it first appears.
Consider the analogy of religion. On some level, everyone believes that
a large proportion of all religious practitioners are mistaken about the
import of their own religious practices. But an atheist does not regard the
implausibility of a large number of people being systematically mistaken
about their own practices as a sufficient reason to adopt believers’ selfunderstanding of prayer. The same, perhaps ironically, is true of believers.
Those who subscribe to the truth claims of a specific creed will necessarily
understand other religionists as systemically mistaken about their own
beliefs. A pious Christian is necessarily an atheist when it comes to the
ancient Egyptian pantheon, for example. Even those who purport to be
generally religious without subscribing to any particular creed cannot avoid
the problem, as they will necessarily regard believers who hold to religious
truth claims in their particularity as mistaken. This problem cannot be
avoided by insisting that—unlike judges—religious believers (or
unbelievers) are, on the whole, misguided or unsophisticated. Only in the
realm of polemic are all believers (or unbelievers) rubes and Philistines. In

The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes
the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every
case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has gone by,
and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 236 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 1963) (1881); see also Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903)
(Holmes, J.) (“When a man commits a tort he incurs by force of the law a liability to damages,
measured by certain rules. When a man makes a contract he incurs by force of the law a liability
to damages, unless a certain promised event comes to pass.”).
200. See Pollock, 77 P.3d at 1122.
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the real world, it is difficult to dismiss Augustine or Aquinas as ignoramuses,
and Nietzsche and Russell stand as ready refutations of the claim that only
idiots are atheists.
The point of this analogy is not to take any particular position with
regard to religious debates. It is simply to point out that very intelligent
people may be systematically mistaken about the practices in which they are
involved. This does not mean that the practices themselves are without
meaning or function—just that the meaning and function are different than
those ascribed to them by the practitioners. Judges may simply be priests
who mistakenly believe that their prayers are efficacious or atheists who
wrongly assume that their blasphemies are intellectually virtuous. Prayer and
blasphemy have meaning and functions; they just may not be the ones
ascribed to them by the penitent or the blasphemous.
The transparency objection can also be met by offering some
explanation of how the civil recourse theory can be squared with the
language of judicial opinions. First, the extent of the disjunction between
legal language and the recourse theory is not as great as the transparency
objection suggests. Certainly, when judges invoke the penalty doctrine, they
use the language of limits in discussing expectation damages. Under a
liquidated-damages clause, a plaintiff is not necessarily entitled to a payment
that would put him or her in as good a position as if the contract had been
performed. Parties are free to contract for the payment of some lesser sum,
as for example when a warranty is coupled with “a money-back guarantee,”
limiting recovery to the purchase price. In such cases courts explicitly invoke
the plaintiff’s expectation interest merely as a limit. Likewise, in cases where
plaintiffs claim damages in excess of their expectation, as for example when
a plaintiff demands reliance damages beyond those necessary to put him in
the position he would have been in had the contract been performed, courts
will explicitly invoke expectation damages as a limit on recovery. Reliance
damages will be awarded “up to” the amount of the plaintiff’s expectation.
Finally, any remaining insistence on the compensatory nature of
expectation damages is belied by the actual behavior of courts. Such
language is insufficient to keep judges from regularly and knowingly
awarding plaintiffs less than the value of their full expectation through the
application of limiting doctrines such as the requirements of certainty, the
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, and the like. A theory’s disregard of such
language can hardly be taken as an affront to judicial self-understanding
when judges themselves routinely ignore the same language in practice.
Even accepting the account of judicial language offered above, the
objection that courts speak of contracts as creating obligations to perform
remains. Unlike Holmes’s theory, however, the civil recourse theory of
contract does not reject the notion of such obligations. Holmes noted with
satisfaction that his “mode of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of
those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they
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can.”201 In contrast, the civil recourse theory need not be less committed to
the notion of such obligations than the more overtly moralizing approaches.
Even a promissory theorist who insists that contract law merely reflects the
morality of promising must acknowledge that the law is incapable of
enforcing all contractual obligations. In some cases this will be literally
impossible, and in other cases, the costs of doing so will be prohibitive.
Those who insist that every contract creates an obligation to perform must
acknowledge that in some cases those obligations will exist without any legal
enforcement. The law may still create moral obligations, but the language of
obligation will not necessarily be an adequate guide to law as a social
practice.
A recourse theorist can make similar concessions. There is nothing
about the civil recourse theory that denies that contracts may create moral
obligations to perform. The civil recourse theory offered here is agnostic on
such questions. On the other hand, the civil recourse theory does not seem
to take the notion of legal obligation to keep a contract any less seriously
than does a promissory theory that purports to account for our current
remedial machinery. Such a theory is also necessarily reconciled to a
disjunction between the language of legal obligation and the reality of legal
remedy. The civil recourse theory is entirely comfortable with saying that
one has an obligation to keep a contract, so long as the obligation is
understood as one where breach gives rise to the right to legitimately
retaliate against the breaching party.
A final response to the transparency objection is to insist on the
distinction between legal language and ordinary moral language. When
judges explain their decision in a particular contract case, they do not
purport to provide a justification for contract law in general. Rather, taking
the law as given, they seek to show how it forms the major premise of an
argument whose conclusion is that this plaintiff wins or loses. Put another
way, judges provide reasons for their decisions, but these reasons are legal,
rather than moral.202 When judges speak of obligations, they refer to legal,
not moral, obligations.203 Likewise, when they speak of compensating a
party for a loss, they mean a legal, not a moral, loss.204 Legal arguments thus
invoke legally normative concepts rather than morally normative concepts.
To be sure, the fact of legal obligation may be a premise in an argument
about moral obligation, but when deciding particular cases, judges do not
make such an argument. Their goal is not to explain why the defendant is or
is not morally reprehensible; rather, it is to explain why the defendant is or
is not legally liable.

201.
202.
203.
204.

Holmes, supra note 199, at 462.
See Oman, supra note 100, at 1493–94.
See id.
See id.
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This does not mean, of course, that legal concepts lack a moral
justification. It does mean, however, that those moral justifications need not
rely on a set of moral claims and obligations whose structure mirrors that of
legal claims and obligations. For example, a body of law might be devoted to
creating efficient incentives by allocating legal obligations. Once the
efficiency theory had allocated the obligations, however, judges could speak
without embarrassment of how a party had a legal duty to perform a
particular act. The judicial language would sound ex post, even
deontological, notwithstanding that the ultimate justification for the body of
law was entirely ex ante and consequentialist.
Of course, we would still be left with the question of why the courts
should use the ex post language of duties in deciding their cases, rather than
the more transparent language of ex ante incentives. The answer is that a
judge decides a particular case applying preexisting rules ex post, even if the
rules themselves are justified on ex ante grounds. Given the fact that in
deciding cases, judges do not justify legal rules, but apply them, the
preference for ex post language is unsurprising and need not imply
anything about the underlying moral structure of the law’s justification. The
fact that judges speak in terms of rights and obligations does not provide an
adequate response to the civil recourse theory’s account of the purposes of
contractual liability. Indeed, given the distinction of justification of
particular outcomes within a body of law and the justification of the body of
law as a whole, the judicial language of rights and obligations may be
reconciled with virtually any normative justification of the practice as a
whole.
C. THE DOCTRINAL OBJECTION
The aim of the recourse theory is to present contractual liability as
embodying in part a commitment to providing disappointed promisees an
avenue of legitimate recourse against breaching promisors through the
courts. A successful interpretive approach will both fit and justify current
contract doctrine.205 Of course, the fit need not be perfect. The common
law of contracts arose over a half millennia of fits, starts, dead ends, and
historical accidents, and it is too much to hope that any theory could make
sense of the entire mass of legal doctrine. One of the tasks of interpretive
theory is to separate a practice’s central themes from the historical detritus.
On the other hand, so long as core features of the doctrine remain
unexplained, it is unlikely that we truly understand the law, unless we are to
assume that it is nothing more than a set of historical accidents bereft of

205. See SMITH, supra note 53; cf. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 52 (nesting the
interpretation of legal concepts within a set of controversial theories about what constitutes law,
how judges ought to decide cases, and the priority of a particular version of liberal moral
philosophy). Dworkin is thus an example of interpretive theory, rather than its sine qua non.
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normative coherence. Accordingly, the failure of a theory to account for a
major set of doctrines must surely count as a point against it. On first
inspection, the doctrines surrounding contract formation, especially the
doctrines of consideration and promissory estoppel, seem to pose major
problems for the civil recourse theory of contract. But upon closer
examination, these doctrines pick out obligations where one would expect a
disappointed promisee to demand satisfaction in the event of breach.
Admittedly, they do so in an ad hoc manner dictated by the historical
accidents of the common law; but when viewed from the perspective of the
civil recourse theory they have a unity of purpose.
The strongest objection to the claim that contracts consist of consent to
retaliation in the event of breach is that intent to be legally bound is not an
element of contract formation under American law.206 A promise becomes
legally enforceable under American law when it is supported by bargainedfor consideration, or when it induces reasonable reliance.207 There is no
additional requirement that the parties intend for their commitments to be
legally enforced.208 This position can be usefully contrasted with English
law, where intent to be legally bound is at least formally required to form a
valid contract.209 Likewise, Randy Barnett has argued on normative grounds
that consent to be legally bound should be the touchstone for contract
formation.210 Whatever the merits of this proposal, it does not represent
current law.211 American law attaches liability to a certain class of
promises—those with consideration or those inducing reasonable reliance—
regardless of the legal intentions of the promisors.212 Put another way, the
rules regarding contract formation do not seem to pick out the class of
promises—those where the promisor consents to recourse by the
promisee—suggested by the civil recourse theory. Accordingly, whatever its
merits as a normative theory, a recourse theory of contract would seem to
fail as an interpretive account of the law.

206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (1981).
207. See id. §§ 18–19.
208. See id. § 17 cmt. c.
209. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the strong presumption under
English law that the parties to a contract intend to be legally bound by forming the same).
210. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 110, at 304 (“Therefore, the phrase ‘a
manifestation of an intention to be legally bound’ neatly captures what a court should seek to
find before holding that a contractual obligation has been created.” (footnote omitted)).
211. Barnett does seem to suggest, however, that the American law is on the cusp of
formally recognizing such a requirement, which he regards as the best account of current
doctrine. See RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 811–12 (4th ed. 2008)
(setting forth “A Hypothetical Alternative to Restatement § 90” hinging on “manifest[ing] an
intention to be legally bound”).
212. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21.
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It is difficult to find modern contract theorists who are enthusiastic
supporters of the doctrine of consideration.213 Stephen Smith, for example,
provided the following tepid endorsement: “[An] examination of the
consideration rule suggests that no explanation can account for all of its
various features. But the examination also suggests that it would be wrong to
conclude (as some have concluded) that the rule is entirely without
rationale.”214 Charles Fried has been more scathing. “The bargain theory of
consideration,” he wrote, “not only fails to explain why [the] pattern of
decisions is just; it does not offer any consistent set of principles from which
all these decisions would flow.”215
Nevertheless, the doctrine of consideration answers an important
practical question. No legal system has ever tried to enforce every promise or
future commitment.216 So which promises does the law enforce? The
modern doctrine of consideration provides a simple answer to this question:
The law will enforce bargained-for promises. One may quarrel about
whether this choice is justified, but it does provide an apparently simple
answer to the threshold question.
Or at least it did to the classical theorists who formulated modern
contract doctrine at the end of the nineteenth century.217 As has been
chronicled many times since then, the ambition to have the law of contracts
pivot on the fulcrum of bargained-for consideration proved a chimera.218
The limits of the bargain principle can be seen in two contexts. The first is
contract modification—one cannot bargain with what one has already given
away. Thus, under the preexisting-duty rule, a performance to which one
was already obligated under a contract cannot serve as consideration on a
new promise.219 The result of this rule has been to require both parties to a
contract to alter their obligations when they want to modify their existing
contractual obligations.220 Courts were frequently forced to resort to
creative readings of the facts of cases—finding recessions and altered

213. Of course, even unloved consideration is not without its partisans. See, e.g., Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1997); Gold,
supra note 144; Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99
(2000).
214. SMITH, supra note 53, at 232.
215. FRIED, supra note 106, at 33.
216. FARNSWORTH, supra note 159, § 1.5, at 11 (“No legal system has ever been reckless
enough to make all promises enforceable.”).
217. See id. § 2.2, at 47–48 (summarizing the rise of the bargain theory of consideration).
218. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 448–54 (1979)
(discussing the rise and fall of the doctrine of consideration).
219. See U.C.C. § 2-209 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981).
220. See Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); Stilk v. Myrick,
(1809) 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (C.P.); 2 Camp. 317.
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obligations out of thin air—to reach seemingly reasonable results.221
Eventually, consideration was abandoned—at least by the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts—as the
exclusive touchstone for contract modification.222 The second context
where consideration broke down involved the enforcement of gratuitous
promises under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In these cases, the
courts simply abandoned the doctrine of bargained-for consideration all
together, enforcing promises that induced reasonable and substantial
reliance.223
In addition, a number of apparently vestigial transactions from before
the rise of the bargain theory of consideration continue to be enforced as
exceptions to the rule. Examples include the enforcement of promises
under seal, written option contracts for the sale of land that recite
(ultimately nonexistent) consideration, and the like.224 This patchwork of
approaches has long frustrated those looking for a clean theory of contract
formation. For instance, promissory estoppel finds a ready justification in
the desire to protect promisees from unfair losses caused by detrimental
reliance.225 But such a rationale cannot be squared with the consideration
doctrine’s willingness to enforce wholly executory bilateral contracts on
which there is no reliance of any kind.226 Likewise, arguments can be
marshaled for the usefulness of a formal device such as a seal—yet since at
least the early seventeenth century, the common law has enforced informal
contracts.227 Whatever the apparent contradictions of these doctrines,
however, it seems clear that none of them hinge on consent to recourse.
Accordingly, the heart of the law of contract formation seems to stand in
stark defiance of the civil recourse theory.
The response to this apparently powerful criticism is that each of the
various routes by which a promise might become a contract—consideration,
reliance, and formality—picks out the sort of promises that a person would
expect to give rise to a legitimate demand for recourse in the event of
breach. Rather than trying to find individual arguments for consideration,
formal contracts, and reliance, we can see all of these devices as picking out
the sort of promises where a promisor might expect a promisee to demand a

221. See, e.g., Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72 (Conn. 1978) (finding a
new contract supported by valid consideration despite no actual written contract after a change
in circumstances).
222. See U.C.C. § 2-209; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89.
223. See Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Ricketts v. Scothorn,
77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898); Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank of Jamestown, 159
N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927).
224. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 95.
225. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 139, at 70.
226. See id. at 77–78.
227. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941).
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right of recourse in the event of breach. Hence, bargains give rise to
contractual liability not because bargains enjoy some special normative
status, but because as an empirical matter, promisors can be held to expect
promisees to demand recourse when bargains are breached. On the other
hand, as an empirical matter, promisors do not expect promisees to demand
recourse in the event that they breach gratuitous and unrelied-on gift
promises. Likewise, when someone reasonably relies on the promise of
another, the promisor may be held to expect that the promisee will demand
some method of recourse in the event of breach.228
To put the point more graphically, in the ancient Near East when a
promisor entered into a covenant, he could expect a demand for recourse if
he hacked a goat to pieces—not because there is any special moral
significance to hacking up a goat, but because there was a shared social
understanding that goat-hacking covenants are the sorts of promises where
promisees will expect recourse in the event of breach.229 This does not
mean that hacking up a goat is the only way in which such expectations
might arise—a heifer, a ram, or a dog seemed to work as well.230 Indeed,
there was no reason why such an expectation could not arise when no
animal, of any species, was hacked to pieces.231 The rituals involving the

228. An analogy may help to illuminate the nature of this claim. Consider the way in which
the criminal law protects personal property. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 771–81
(1997) (discussing crimes against personal property). The crime of larceny punishes those who
take property that is not their own. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 (1985). The crime of fraud
punishes those who obtain the property of others through deception. See id. § 223.3. The crime
of robbery punishes those who obtain property by threatening physical violence. See id. § 222.1.
The crime of blackmail punishes those who obtain property by threatening others with
wrongful conduct. See id. § 223.4. We can understand all these crimes in at least two ways. First,
we might see them as a bundle of essentially unrelated wrongs. Larceny punishes the taking of
what is not one’s own, fraud punishes lying, robbery punishes the use of threats of violence, and
blackmail punishes other threats. The apparent unity of these crimes is largely accidental.
Alternatively, one might say that in each of these cases we are picking out a particular kind of
wrongful conversion of the property of another. Notice the second approach sees the
distinction between these various crimes as a matter of convenience and historical accident.
This rather ad hoc explanation, however, confers the benefit of revealing the latent unity
between the various crimes. It also avoids some of the problems that a more particularized
account of the crimes runs into. For example, if fraud is about punishing lies, we are left with
the problem of accounting for the fact that the law does not punish all lies, but only those used
to obtain property from another.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 1, 9.
230. See supra text accompanying note 7.
231. For example, in the so-called Shechem Covenant, recounted in the final chapter of
Joshua, the Children of Israel enter into a covenant to serve God and Joshua sets up a stone
under a tree to memorialize the covenant, explaining that should they breach their obligations,
the jealous God of Israel will demand vengeance. What was important was not the particular
formality—dismembered animals or stones under a tree—or even the presence of formality at
all. What mattered was that parties expected recourse in the event of breach. See Joshua 24:1–28
(King James) (setting forth the story of the Shechem Covenant); THE NEW JEROME BIBLICAL
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dismembered livestock just happen to be one of the myriad of situations in
which such expectations arose.232
There are at least two objections to the claim that formation doctrines
pick out consent to recourse as an empirical matter. The first objection is
that it smuggles an intent to be legally bound back into the theory by
locating that intent in a social understanding that happens to coincide with
the doctrinal categories. The second objection is that the claim views the
doctrine as a set of essentially accidental and ad hoc attempts to get at a
concept that does not quite seem to be present in the rules. There is some
truth to both of these objections, but neither ultimately provides a reason
for rejecting the claim that consideration, promissory estoppel, and other
formation doctrines pick out promises where promisors expect promisees to
demand recourse.
There is a sense in which this first objection is correct, but we must be
careful about what we mean when we say “an intent to be legally bound.”
The absence of any requirement to be legally bound can be justified
precisely because the law seeks to capture a preexisting set of social
understandings of when commitments give rise to a legitimate expectation
of recourse in the event of breach. Because the duty arises out of these social
understandings, however, it is not absolute. If the parties actually have a
different understanding, that understanding controls.233 For example, even
though under American law there is no requirement that contracting parties
intend to be legally bound, if they both agree not to be legally bound, then
no contract is formed.234 The doctrine seeks to track what it assumes would
be the parties’ understanding and willingly steps back when their mutually
expressed understandings diverge from the default position. There is an
implicit assumption that parties do intend to be legally bound—an
assumption that the law will abandon in the face of contrary evidence.
The second objection is that this interpretation of formation doctrines
views the doctrine as a set of essentially accidental and ad hoc attempts to
get at a concept that is not quite present in the rules. This is true, and a

COMMENTARY 130–31 (Raymond Brown et al. eds., 1990) (discussing the formalities of the
Shechem Covenant).
232. This interpretation reveals the nature of the error committed by the classical theorists.
Classical-contract doctrine failed to meet its goal of turning consideration into a necessary
condition for contractual liability. This failure does not, however, preclude it from serving as a
sufficient condition. Furthermore, the sufficiency of consideration does not imply that other
elements cannot be sufficient as well. What matters is not the special moral status of bargains;
rather, consideration matters because of the socially shared meaning of bargains, a meaning
that includes an expectation of satisfaction in the event of breach. The same is true of reliance
and vestigial formalisms like contracts under seal. Nothing about the fact that parties to a
bargain expect some form of recourse in the event of breach is logically inconsistent with
similar expectations in other factual situations.
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981).
234. See id.
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more abstract rule—say, that contracts arise out of consent to retaliation in
the event of breach, and in the absence of contrary evidence such consent
will be presumed where the parties could reasonably expect a legitimate
right of recourse in the event of breach—would better track the justification
offered by the recourse theory. There are two reasons why the absence of
such a general rule need not be fatal to the interpretation offered here.
First, such a general principle would provide courts with little guidance in
resolving particular cases.235 Rule-of-law values such as predictability and the
limitation of judicial discretion counsel in favor of rules at a finer level of
granularity.236 Second, any account of contractual liability must be willing to
tolerate a certain amount of ad hoc historical accident. To demand a perfect
fit between theory and institution would set a bar for interpretative theory so
high as to deprive the project of any meaning. Such a demand would
effectively amount to an all-or-nothing approach to the normative
coherence of the law. It would also rob interpretative theory of its
usefulness, which in part is to identify those portions of the law that fail to fit
within any plausible justifying theory and are therefore good candidates for
reform.
In comparing the interpretive success of theories, we are thus left with
the need to weigh their comparative coherence. Because the
interdependence of what is being explained and explanation is inherent in
interpretive arguments,237 the best that we can hope for is an oscillation
between good-faith adjustments to our theory and reexamination of the
explained practice until some reflective equilibrium is reached.238 While the
account of formation doctrines offered here suggests that they are ad hoc
and historically contingent attempts to get at a broader class of agreements,
this account does have the advantage of seeing these doctrines as having a
certain unity. In contrast, other theories view them in opposition to one
another, with reliance, for example, representing a tort-like intrusion into
the bargain-centered world of contract.239 Finally, in contrast to some other
theories, the account offered here does not require the wholesale rejection

235. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 138–40 (William
Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1997) (discussing the comparative advantages of using rules
versus standards); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 98 (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz
eds., 1991) (“If . . . we see rules not so much as implements for achieving predictability but as
devices for the allocation of power, then it is far from clear that granting the power to a ruleapplier to determine whether following the rule is on the balance of reasons desirable on this
occasion is necessarily desirable.”).
236. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 110–13 (rev. ed. 1969).
237. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 267 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 2004) (discussing the hermeneutic circle).
238. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42–45 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the idea of
reflective equilibrium).
239. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95–98 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d
ed. 1995).
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of formation doctrines. For example, a promissory theory has a difficult time
explaining why some promises should fail to give rise to contracts at all.240
After all, if one has a moral obligation to keep one’s promises, the State’s
obligation to enforce seems odd—even perverse—because it allows some
promise breakers to escape legal sanction entirely.241 In contrast, the
account offered here renders formation doctrines meaningful if historically
contingent and idiosyncratic.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article began with the bloody covenant rituals of the Bible and
Homer. The agreement between Priam and Agamemnon recounted in The
Iliad ultimately failed. The attempt to limit war through cooperation broke
down, fighting resumed, and after the sack of Troy, Agamemnon returned
to Argos. In his Oresteia trilogy,242 Aeschylus continues the story, recounting
how Agamemnon’s wife Clytaemnestra murdered him in revenge for his
earlier sacrifice of their daughter. Clytaemnestra, in turn, was killed by her
son Orestes in revenge for the murder of his father. In the final play of the
trilogy, Orestes, pursued by the Furies, a vengeful band of outraged
demigods, flees to Athens, throwing himself on the mercy of the goddess
Athena. The Furies, embodying vengeance, feud, and outraged honor,
demand the murderer. Orestes’s patron, the god Apollo, calls for the
summary expulsion of the Furies from the city, dismissing them as nothing
more than agents of senseless violence:
Go where heads are severed, eyes gouged out,
where Justice and bloody slaughter are the same . . .
castrations, wasted seed, young men’s glories butchered,
extremities maimed, and huge stones at the chest,
and victims wail for pity—
spikes inching up the spine, torsos stuck on spikes.243
One might say that Apollo wishes to relegate the Furies to a world where life
is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”244
Athena’s response, however, is more measured. She submits Orestes to
the judgment of the Athenian court, allowing the Furies to make the case for
his punishment. The jury is hung, and Athena reluctantly casts the final vote
for acquittal on the grounds that Clytaemnestra’s crimes justified Orestes’s

240. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 106, at 39 (arguing that the doctrine of consideration
cannot be justified on any grounds).
241. See Shiffrin, supra note 117, at 710–11.
242. I am grateful to Josh Chafetz for bringing the connection between Aeschylus’s Oresteia
and civil recourse to my attention. Any errors in interpretation, of course, remain mine.
243. AESCHYLUS, The Eumenides, in THE ORESTEIA 227, 239 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin
Books 1984) (c. 458 B.C.E.) (lines 183–88).
244. HOBBES, supra note 12, at 89.
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matricide, enraging the Furies. Their leader insists to Athena that by
supplanting vengeance with adjudication, “you have ridden down the
ancient laws, wrenched them from my grasp.”245 Athena, however, refuses to
cast the Furies from the city. Instead, she invites them to take a hallowed
place buried beneath its foundations, an offer the Furies ultimately accept.
Athena tells the citizens of her city:
Neither anarchy nor tyranny, my people.
Worship the Mean, I urge you,
shore it up with reverence and never
banish terror from the gates, not outright.246
The title of the final play is The Eumenides, which refers to the
transformation of the Furies—literally, the “kindly ones.” In the final speech
of the play, the women of the city, acting as chorus, sing their praises:
You great good Furies, bless the land with kindly hearts,
you Awesome Spirits, come—exult in the blazing torch,
exult in our fires, journey on.247
The civil recourse theory of contractual liability rests on a sensibility
similar to that put forward by Aeschylus. The earliest covenant rituals
consisted of consent to violent retaliation in the event of breach. In effect,
the parties invited the Furies into their relationship in the hope of creating
trust sufficient for cooperation. It was a dangerous expedient, one that
resulted in a fragile cooperation prone to violent breakdown. Hobbes,
following Aeschylus’s Apollo, insisted that the Furies must be driven from
the community by an omnipotent Leviathan. To the extent that modern
theories of contract focus their attention exclusively on the way that the law,
as a third party, enforces agreements, they rest on a similar sensibility. The
common law took a different course. Rather than eliminating private
retaliation, the common law tamed and limited it. The Furies, however,
remain buried deep within the structure of contractual liability. Damage
measures act less as fines or entitlements to compensation than as limits on
private retaliation. Indeed, inherent in the notion of money damages is itself
the notion of a limit on retaliation that eliminates the possibility of personal
violence. Perhaps most strikingly, contract law does not enforce contracts
per se; rather, it empowers disappointed promisees to act against breaching
promisors through the courts.

245.
246.
247.

AESCHYLUS, supra note 243, at 267 (lines 820–21).
Id. at 262 (lines 709–12).
Id. at 276 (lines 1050–52).

